On Diversity by Cimini, Amy & Moreno, Jairo
GAMUT 2/1 (2009) 
© 2009 NEWFOUND PRESS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ISSN: 1938-6690 
ON DIVERSITY* 
 
AMY CIMINI AND JAIRO MORENO 
 
 
 
DIVERSE: to “turn apart” (ME & OFr < L diversus, pp. of divertere, to turn aside < dis-, 
apart + vertere, to turn). 
 
he word “diverse,” etymology informs us, appears in the thirteenth century, perhaps in 
analogy with a term used in geometry, “transverse.” Roughly four and a half centuries 
later, the word’s meaning becomes more or less fixed: an adjective signifying “different in char-
acter or quality.” Late in the 1930s, “diverse” emerges as a verb to designate a new imperative in 
U.S. economics: to diversify, meaning the careful quantitative distribution of various invest-
ments. By 1978, in a landmark United States Supreme Court ruling on university admissions, the 
word “diversity,” now a noun, comes to inscribe both a qualitative distinction of ethno-cultural 
groups and their quantitative distribution in institutions of higher education. Although the 
balance between quality and quantity, as well as their definition, was subject of much legal 
dispute, the notion became widely accepted that diversity of representation of various groups was 
fundamental to the educational mission of the university and the well-being of the social field. 
Whenever we speak of diversity in the U.S., we invoke the spirit of the Supreme Court’s 
definition. 
                                     
 * The authors would like to thank Ana María Ochoa for comments on a draft of this article, and Clara Latham 
for expert research assistance. Jairo Moreno also thanks Philip Ewell and Frederick Bashour for the invitation to 
participate in the 2007 Society for Music Theory diversity panel in Baltimore. 
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 “Diverse” shares its root (Latin vertere, to turn) with a singularly powerful word: 
“universe.” Although ostensibly diversity’s opposite (in that it signifies movement towards 
unity), universality lends diversity much political force today: diversity threatens to become a 
universal. Below we examine this force in historical and juridical perspective, and consequently, 
much of this article addresses how diversity’s “universal” status is historically and institutionally 
posited, contested, and negotiated. Further, we view the elaboration of the relation between 
diversity and universality as the sedimentation of a certain historical movement propelled by the 
desires, fears, imagination, needs, struggles, and worries of individuals and collectivities across 
the social field, of institutions of civil society, and of the state. Our analysis of this complex word 
traces multiple vectors of that movement. 
 Now, consider one particular instance of this “turning apart” implied by “diverse.” 
Members of the American Musicological Society (AMS) demanded, in 1977, space for work 
different in character and quality from the positive archival and historical interests predominant 
at the time. Those members—disciplinary insurgents, it would turn out—were in essence asking 
the AMS to allow a self-turning apart, to make a formal commitment to a number of different 
areas of study and research, including music-theoretical work. In short, those members 
demanded that the AMS diversify. That insurgent movement converged in the formation of the 
Society for Music Theory (SMT). 
 Perhaps, then, “diverse” is always “diverse from,” and so institutionalizing “diversity” 
also always involves institutionalizing some form of insurrection. This insurrection, however, 
does not simply cease when demands for diversity are met. Quite to the contrary, once set into 
motion, this process of institutionalization introduces what Étienne Balibar calls a “latent insur-
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rection” at the heart of all collective organizations and all institutions.1 By this logic, diversity 
begets diversity; in dialectical terms to be explored later in this article, diversity contains its own 
negation. The force of this negation drives political change. Diversity is a horizon to which orga-
nizations and institutions might aspire. Its disruptive force, however, compromises the project of 
ever fulfilling that aspiration. In this sense, diversity poses a unique temporal problem for 
politics: at what point can it be said that adequate or sufficient diversity has been achieved?  
 The disciplinary diversification in music studies from 1979 is different in quality and 
character from the diversity advocated by the SMT’s Committee on Diversity (henceforth, “the 
Committee”). The latter was formed in 1996, at a time in which, as an institution, the SMT 
sought to set up a dispositive both to respond to the increasing demographic heterogeneity of the 
field of music theory and to further that heterogeneity by recruiting and mentoring members of 
underrepresented peoples (see Appendix 1). In 2007, when the panel convened of which this 
paper was part, there was a sense of crisis. The underlying message of the special session 
“Voices from the Field,” organized by the Committee on Diversity, was that although work to 
diversify the SMT had been done, much more remained to be done (see Appendix 2).  
 Surprisingly, there are no available statistics for SMT membership according to the stan-
dard U.S. demographic categories of ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, and nationality.2 
Nonetheless, we might infer that the overall balance is not very, well, diverse. Furthermore, if it 
existed, such a tabulation would powerfully ascribe qualitative distinctions to individuals, while 
the percentages would describe the quantitative distribution of these ascriptions in field as a 
                                     
 1 Étienne Balibar, “Ambiguous Universality,” Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 7/1 (1995): 
48–74. 
 2 Results published in 2005, from a study by the SMT’s Committee on the Status of Women, found that out of 
one hundred SMT-member respondents, 30% were female and 70% were male (Janna Saslaw, “Committee on the 
Status of Women,” SMT Newsletter 28/1 [2005]: 7–8). 
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whole. These statistics would buttress the Committee’s injunction to further animate the distri-
butions of those qualities and quantities, adjusting their proportions perhaps by means of canon 
expansion (a common theme in the Committee’s programming since 1996), methodological 
adjustment, curricular revision, and active recruitment and organization. However, this 
injunction would remain committed to the particular ascriptions of the table, because they 
historically organize and drive the politics of diversity in the academy. By this logic, the 
injunction and the distribution to which it responds seem to collapse into one another, and this 
happens at an institutional level. One of our goals in this article is to interrogate the juridico-
political process of this institutionalization, assessing the stake of adhering to its categories in 
this historical moment. Neither the broader academic field nor the relationship of the academy to 
the larger social field in and within which the SMT was founded are now what they were when 
the Committee came into being in 1996. Those shifts are in need of examination. To this end, 
this article offers an analysis of “diversity” along three axes: 
(1) As a socio-technical dispositive attending to specific historical pressures on the SMT, where 
the SMT constitutes an institution and socio-political space in constant transformation; 
(2) As a juridical category receiving juridical form responding to national disputes about social 
parity in higher education and graduate professional training; and 
(3) As a dimension of subjectivity in which the experiences of actresses in the field and outside 
of it give diversity agency in the educational mission of the contemporary university. 
We begin with this final axis. 
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I. ETHNIC MANEUVERS IN THE DARK 
 Participants in the 2007 Committee on Diversity panel, “Voices from the Field,” were 
invited to address the issue of diversity from our personal experience in the field. To honor that 
request, I (Jairo Moreno) related a couple of stories that I also include below: one from my first 
forays into the job market while in graduate school at Yale, another from my first professional 
appointment at Duke University. 
 Early in 1995, I had my first-ever campus interview, at a small liberal arts college and 
conservatory in the great North American Midwest. It went well, and much to my surprise I was 
offered a tenure-track position. I politely declined. I always thought of that decision as stemming 
from the bio-cultural impossibility of withstanding minus-20° Celsius in the Wisconsin tundra 
while on the way to discuss the finer points of dominant prolongations to astute young musi-
cians, early in a spring semester. 
 Another interview materialized right after, this time in the Southwest. I had been pretty 
much myself during the first interview. In the first-year evaluation at Yale I had been described 
as bringing a lighthearted attitude to complex discussions, or something to that effect; so I 
decided that I shouldn’t tamper with my style while at the largest state university in the largest 
state of the Union. After all, I thought, I might feel slightly more at home there; I mean, there 
were quite a few Spanish-speakers down there, lots of folk with resonant vowels at the end of 
their last names and that kind of thing. And so I did: I went down there, was “myself,” and 
bombed the interview, big-time. Upon return to New Haven, I was gently taken aside by the 
person then serving as department Chair. After a quick chitchat about the interview (which the 
Chair, it seemed to me, had already heard about), the Chair retorted, tongue-in-cheek: “Jairo, you 
shouldn’t be so . . . um . . . what is the word I am looking for . . . um . . . ‘Lat’n’!” 
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 This was the kind of comment that was at once absolutely clear and perplexingly obscure. 
Coming from an experienced and well-respected professor, and an insider in the discipline, I 
could not afford not to listen. That much I knew. But much was left for me to infer within the 
limited context in which the speaker could have possibly known me. (By the time the Chair 
joined the faculty, I was finished with course work and not working as a TA.) On the speculative 
evidence from my first-year evaluation letter, I guessed that perhaps taking too casual an attitude 
might have been inappropriate to the formal protocols of an academic job interview. I could 
chalk that up to a combination of my ignorance, naïveté, and disingenuousness. Beyond that, all 
my guessing was based on a nebulous syntax that all of the sudden appeared to be the key to 
understand how one’s “personality” could be—and would be—inserted into a vaster and 
incomprehensible grammar of stereotypes. If in the context of graduate school I could be marked 
as “Lat’n,” in another I’d be “Hispanic,” or “Colombian” in yet another. And I am sure there are 
more contexts still. 
 Now, I don’t recall being rattled by the comment itself (or thinking something silly, like 
being seen to carry an imaginary tropical fruit basket on my head); and I certainly didn’t blame 
my failure at the interview on whatever it was that the Chair was communicating. (Among other 
things, during the interview my answers to most questions were simply inadequate, and my job 
talk went well over the allotted time.) Nonetheless, if the effect of the Chair’s utterance on me 
was immediate and personal, the structure of its identity ascription was not. In time, the reach of 
this institutional structure began to dawn on me as an individual. Two things came into clearer 
focus: 
(1) The pervasiveness of this syntax across the entire social field in the U.S., to organize inter-
personal and institutional relations; and 
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(2) The possibility of working as an academic would entail taking a stance vis-à-vis such ascrip-
tions, that is, managing my newly acquired consciousness of the things that I could represent 
to potential employers, peers, and eventual colleagues. 
 A short while later I managed to ask the Chair to be more specific about the meaning of 
“Lat’n.” To the Chair’s credit, s/he did, confirming my initial intuition that a personality trait had 
been scaled out to a group identity category: “. . . well, you know, don’t be so informal all the 
time.” As an example, the Chair suggested that, if possible, I should avoid touching people I had 
just met. (A slight tap on the shoulders of a new acquaintance is not an uncommon practice 
where I grew up.) Fair enough, I said. 
 I don’t know if I toned down my “Lat’n” sociability habits, simply got better at inter-
views, or knew that, with the dissertation close to being finished, I needed to get a job, but the 
following year I was lucky to have two excellent job offers. First, though, I did heed the advice 
of the Chair who, before I headed south for an interview, had kindly suggested that I maintain a 
respectful distance and adopt a deferential attitude towards the interviewers, particularly a British 
scholar member of one of the committees. And so it was that, apart from giving firm handshakes 
and politely laughing at the odd jokes that punctuate all interviews (as instructed by those in the 
know), I never came any closer than two feet from anybody—which is what I imagined some 
normative Anglo-American personal space to be. Over the course of two interminable days I 
worked really hard to keep any limb that might have come into uncomfortable or inappropriate 
contact with somebody else’s body (British or not) tied to my increasingly stiff torso. Shortly 
afterward I received the call offering me the position. I accepted it. 
 That year I joined Duke. I was the only “Hispanic” among some twenty-three new faculty 
hires. That much I knew from the statistics the University publicized, which I eventually came to 
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know as part of a years-long Faculty Initiative, a coordinated effort to recruit minority professors 
to tenure-track positions. In 1996, the split for all regular faculty was 89% White, 6% Asian, 3% 
Black non-Hispanic, and 2% Hispanic.3 Because of the ascription “Hispanic,” I—whose skin 
color is on the whiter shade of pale—shared this category with a Galician (Spain) colleague, 
whose intensely dark skin would have made the casual onlooker consider him to be of African or 
Southeast Asian descent. He, a senior Latin Americanist literary eminence with formidable 
Hegelian credentials and outlook, and I, a junior middling music theorist with a fatal weakness 
for a certain post-Heideggerianism of French origin, could be intellectually labeled as accom-
plices with Eurocentrism—for being (for academic liberals like ourselves) on the wrong side of 
the 1980s culture wars and its aftershocks throughout the 1990s. Additionally, we might be 
ideologically labeled as members of the great unmarked and hegemonic troves of faculty every-
where who were fatally and un-redeemably unaware of our oppressive perpetuation of the study 
of “whiteness,” which were the most damning charges in the self-appointed court of epistemo-
logical justice ran by ethno-racial identitarians incapable of imagining other forms of academic 
politics. None of these charges ever materialized. But within the institutional environment at 
Duke, race, ethnicity, and the cultural values attached to these categories were never far from 
earshot. Other colleagues seemed quite engaged in affirming them, either in their scholarly work 
or in passionate rhetoric at meetings, letters to the student paper, casual conversation, and so on. 
It was hard, if not outright impossible, not to think in intensely racialized terms. 
 In passing conversation with my Galician colleague, it turned out that our lower middle-
class parents had similar interests, which could well have influenced our eventual lives as 
academics; there were lots of books at hand, some classical music (it was Rossini time on 
                                     
 3 Institutional Research, Office of the Provost, Duke University. 
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Saturday mornings at my house, late Beethoven at his), a healthy obsession with education, 
rigorous secondary education in the humanities, and so on. It certainly did not escape my 
attention that at this late stage of modernity, a citizen from a former colony and one from the 
former imperial power could be so neatly lumped under a single ascription in the hands of the 
new empire. Indeed, “Hispanic” was first officially deployed in the 1970 census, during the 
Nixon administration, in an effort to accommodate an increasing number of peoples of Latin 
American origin, regardless of race. The trajectory of this ascription is quite telling: in the 1930s 
“Mexicans” were counted, by the 1940s the criterion was “persons of Spanish mother tongue,” 
by the 1950s and 1960s “persons of Spanish surname.” “Hispanic” is consolidated just as official 
ascription became central in the management of ethnic populations.4 
 At Duke, and at one extreme and powerful distributive figuration of this ascription, we 
constituted part of the percentage of total Hispanic faculty (1.5% by 2001), along with other such 
distributions, such as the percentage of Black non-Hispanic faculty (3.6% by 2001), all carefully 
tabulated and advertised by the administration. These totalizing figurations of course played a 
central function within the calculus of a certain institutional level operating well beyond indi-
viduals like my colleague and I. Yet, this calculus obeyed a peculiar logic in which the dual 
virtue of our experiences as individuals and our qualities as members of ethnically recognized 
groups would enrich the educational mission of the University. Such was the burden of exem-
plarity I learned about as a junior professor, and it may have been the most difficult and 
intractable lesson of life as an academic in the U.S.  
                                     
 4 For discussion of the history of political practices of labeling, see Suzanne Oboler, Ethnic Labels, Latino 
Lives: Identity and the Politics of (Re)Presentation in the United States (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1995). 
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 It was never clear, however, whether or not this calculus compelled one to disidentify, as 
I had attempted while interviewing there, or to perform whatever ethno-racial identitarian 
maneuvers were necessary to get ahead in academia, as others I knew had successfully done. For 
my part, I remained in the dark, performing my own maneuvers in the penumbra between being 
too “Lat’n” and never being Latin enough. Whether or not I sufficiently or adequately contrib-
uted to the cultural, intellectual, or social diversity of the institution, I never truly knew. 
 
II. POLITICS OF CULTURE 
 “It might be easier to achieve social justice in Colombia than to think outside identity 
politics in the mainstrean U.S. academy.” These words, from Ana María Ochoa-Gautier, my one-
time colleague at New York University, would sum up my increasing awareness—although not 
necessarily my understanding—of what was at stake in continuing to work as an academic in the 
U.S. 
 Even the simple stories above indicate the kinds of difficulties that emerge as an institu-
tional dispositive mobilizes various forces across the social field. The stories show the perplexity 
that institutional ascriptions might generate for individuals either unable to decipher its codes or 
simply ignorant of the interpretive frameworks that lend those codes social intelligibility and 
meaning. Identity ascription, and the cultural background that this identity is assumed and 
expected to represent, are central to the work of diversity in institutional settings. Indeed, as we 
discuss now, because of rational and affective dimensions founded on notions of culture and 
identity, “diversity” gains and retains a great deal of power and appeal—power articulated 
through a vast network of formal and informal discourse, from the U.S. Supreme Court to the 
consumer market. 
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 The rational and affective force that culture and identity carry in the public sphere makes 
it easy to overlook their role in mediating the relation between the state and civil society and in 
legitimizing juridical and legislative measures. Culture and identity have become part of a 
generally shared discursive ground for the imminently political practices of consensus-forming. 
But culture and identity transcend the discursive dimension of social life; more precisely, they 
come to form part of a political life-world in which “affective relations and the state are imma-
nent to each other.”5 The following section sketches out a genealogy of processes by which the 
ascription of identity fuse with the notion of cultural sovereignty. We then map how this fusion 
constitutes a uniquely U.S. contribution to democratic practice. Owing to this nation’s formida-
ble disseminating capacities, this “process” has gained something like universal status: identity 
politics. Perhaps here, diversity and universality coincide yet again. First, much political work 
had to be done to reach this point of coincidence. 
∑ 
 In the late 1960s, Kevin Phillips, then a Republican Party strategist and operative and 
now a reputable political historian and critic of the G.O.P., helped engineer what is known as the 
Southern Strategy. The objective was to win over white, low-income voters to the Republican 
Party; the method was to incite social divisions along the color line in Southern states: racial 
politics at their rawest and worst. This was done not by curtailing gains attained by minorities 
through the Voting Rights Act of 1965 but precisely by promoting them. As the number of 
blacks registering for the Democratic Party increased, Phillips wagered, so would the number of 
racist whites turning to the G.O.P. Why? Because at the beginning of the decade, Southern 
                                     
 5 John Beasley-Murray, “Subaltern Politics: Solidarity and Critique (Or, Four Theses on Posthegemony),” paper 
presented at the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Congress (Washington, D.C., 2001), 3. 
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Democrats opposed Civil Rights more fiercely than Republicans. Feeling betrayed by their own 
party because of a federally mandated disruption of their local and communitarian social 
orders—for instance, school busing—these voters were affectively susceptible to political 
redistribution. To accomplish this redistribution, the Nixon campaign made wide appeal to 
powerful notions of states’ rights. This permitted invocations of local cultural identity, of 
communal and individual decision-making, of the promise of a redistribution of power admini-
stration back to the states. In the context of the Party’s strategy, these effects sustain the 
possibility that Southern white identity, particularly among the working class, might well survive 
the perceived sweeping changes in U.S. society. Along the way, self-reliance was invoked as a 
quintessentially “American value” and the liberal establishment and bureaucracy was cast as an 
accomplice of minorities in squeezing out “middle America”—an enduring coinage of the Nixon 
camp.6 
 The history of populism is strewn with political maneuvers such as Phillips’ and it is well 
beyond the present purposes to provide a more detailed account of the rise of right-wing popu-
lism in the U.S. at the end of the 1960s. But suffice it to note that Phillips’ strategy did manage 
to attain what he called a Republican majority—the title of his 1969 classic. The G.O.P. 
successfully co-opted the figure and values of the “everyday man” (i.e., a predominantly male, 
white working class) as its own, not just in the South but across vast expanses in the Midwest 
and elsewhere. The consequences of this were still felt dramatically in the 2000 and 2004 presi-
dential elections. 
                                     
 6 Another such coinage, “Silent Majority,” mobilized people not invested in either the counter-cultural move-
ment or the anti-War demonstrations. 
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 The dynamics of this moment in modern political history are consequences of then-
emerging uncertainties about the utopian promises of the post-war years, uncertainties that would 
help drive the promotion of culture and group identity as viable political options. In broad terms, 
the post-war period ushers in the decline of an “American society” that understood itself as 
culturally homogeneous. That this was a matter of perception by the white majority cannot be 
emphasized enough. Additionally, post-war economic changes made it impossible for the U.S. to 
rely on the continuing prosperity that the nation enjoyed in the post-war years. These are conse-
quences of, on the one hand, the increased visibility of minorities in the wake of the Civil Rights 
movement and, on the other, an increasingly competitive market resulting from an accelerated 
decline of communitarian input on economic decisions, which leads in turn to new patterns of 
consumption along group-identity lines. Generational dissension would challenge ideas of the 
nuclear family. The anti-establishment, left-oriented metropolitan youth activists on university 
campuses, fighting for free speech, would enter into conflict with a traditional leftist sector, the 
labor unions. The conflict produced an unprecedented clash between two powerful socio-
political values of U.S. life: individualism and communitarianism. Outright hostility toward the 
Vietnam War fanned doubts about administrative reason and eroded the state’s moral ground. 
 This is a time of reckoning for the Civil Rights movement as well, which, following the 
assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, had to reassess the capacity of American society to 
accept its rightful demands. The movement, and certainly its black membership, underwent 
radical transformations. Black politics and activism would include both Black Nationalist mili-
tant organizations and movements such as the Reverend Jesse Jackson’s Operation PUSH that 
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sought to work within a political apparatus already busy at work to siphon away any electoral 
power black citizens might have gained earlier the decade.7 
 The issue of individual and group rights presented ongoing structural challenges in the 
context of the Civil Rights movement. Although compelled to confront systematic access ineq-
uities in employment, health care, and housing among cultural, ethno-racial, and gender groups, 
the state’s antidiscrimination legislation and programs were designed to protect individual rights 
as inscribed in the Fourteenth Amendment. Whatever gains the Civil Rights movement had made 
to promote a color-blind society, the end of the decade cast doubts on the power of legislative 
and administrative reason to guarantee and protect social justice, be it for individuals or groups. 
 Earlier in that decade, however, the state had launched some of the most radical (and for 
many, progressive) projects of social reform since Roosevelt’s New Deal. Johnson’s “Great 
Society” included federally funded programs to wage a “War on Poverty” with “community 
action” as its main weapon.8 By relying on local activism to create the necessary momentum for 
economic self-empowerment and self-determination, the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) 
created opportunities for leadership parallel to the traditional political structures of city councils 
and mayors. It wasn’t long before career politicians felt the threat of this emerging political class 
and sought legal avenues to slow its development. These efforts were, unfortunately, successful. 
 As Johnson’s anti-poverty programs expanded, however, so did his investment in the 
Vietnam War. As the war dragged on, it became increasingly evident that a disproportionate 
number of deployed soldiers and casualties came from those economically disadvantaged groups 
that the EOA sought to assist: Blacks and Latinos. This contradiction cast a shadow on the inten-
                                     
 7 Operation PUSH, founded in 1971, is an acronym of People United to Serve Humanity. 
 8 Economic Opportunity Act, 1964. 
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tions behind community empowerment when many of those communities’ most able working 
bodies being sent off to battle. This tension between the military demographic, as a paradigmatic 
reflection of the real—i.e., patriotic—society, and other institutions’ demographic distribution, 
will play a role nearly thirty years later in one of the Supreme Court’s most important decisions 
about diversity in higher education. Some interpreters would blame increasing war expenditure 
on the eventual drainage of social program funding. History will never know. 
 To return to the 1970s, the Nixon administration eventually disbanded the EOA and 
redistributed its domains (education, health, and housing) across a dense and intractable 
bureaucratic network of federal agencies unreachable through direct community input. Planning 
for solutions to basic societal needs would be transferred to technocrats, reflecting a turn towards 
specialized knowledge and a new culture of rational management of social access distribution. 
Of course, this was the same administration that gained power by appealing to communal senses 
of cultural self-determination in the white South. On the new front of culture as politics, the 
Nixon administration would deploy the same logic to inculcate the value of self-determination in 
a number of “minority” communities (i.e., those demographically marked as colored). This was 
no contradiction. Both programs embodied a strategic awareness of the enduring power and 
pliable qualities of notions of culture, identity, and community to do politics. 
 One of the EOA’s most lasting effects was encouraging communities to become aware of 
their own practices of cultural sovereignty; that is, to bring into their consciousness that there 
were everyday practices proper to specific locations and best known through the authority of 
experience of those engaged in them, day in and out. This goes some way to explain how many 
community organizers successfully became political leaders. These leaders had expertise in the 
new political currency, culture, which they could rearticulate to the new political possibilities the 
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state now offered. Consequently, their success should not be reduced to some kind of need to fill 
in the void left as the federal government withdrew from the micro-administration of the social 
field. At stake is nothing less than the cultivation and mobilization of cultural sovereignty in the 
political field. The state now offered the recognition of the needs of subordinate groups defined 
by ethno-racial cultural identity under a new set of “means of access to goods and services 
provided by the welfare state.”9 
 A decade after the heyday of the Civil Rights movement and its vision of a color-blind 
society, minority politics were framed within a softer, vaguer, and ultimately more juridically 
pliable vision of a color-conscious society. This passage from a language of “rights” (which, 
again, had in the individual their minimal unit of intelligibility and legislative power) to a more 
humanistic but more broad and elusive language of “needs” (which had collectivities as their 
ideal social unit) coincided with two major displacements in the politics of dissention.10 First, the 
neutralization of radical manifestations of color-consciousness in minority resistance groups, 
which included armed Black, Chicano, and Puerto Rican movements, all of which were violently 
repressed and many eventually decommissioned, quite literally. Second, as George Yúdice 
remarks, “political action gave way to political brokerage in increasingly institutionalized 
settings: university programs in African American, Chicano, Puerto Rican, and women’s studies; 
community cultural programs; bilingual education programs; and more.”11 There they would 
                                     
 9 George Yúdice, The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2003), 55. 
 10 Yúdice, The Expediency of Culture, 54. 
 11 Yúdice, The Expediency of Culture, 54. The first Black Studies department was at San Francisco State (1968). 
Chicano studies programs were first founded at U.C.-Los Angeles (1969), followed by California State Northridge 
(1969), U.T.-El Paso (1970), and U.C.-Santa Barbara (1971). San Diego State College opens the first Women’s 
Studies program, in 1970. 
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remain, increasingly unable to interact effectively with or affect the messy “culture” of electoral 
politics and its institutions. 
 Cultural affirmation had solidified as the means for minority disenfranchised groups to 
demand that the state satisfy their rightful needs. For its part, the state demanded that groups 
making those demands be legitimately recognized if they met the proper standards of cultural 
affirmation. The state considered some differences (race, gender, and heterosexuality) to be 
normative and non-mutable—and distributed the social terrain for identity politics accordingly. 
In other cases, groups were compelled to locate “surrogate terrains” for identity formation, such 
as language for Hispanics or sexuality for homosexuals.12 Recognition defused resistance and 
guaranteed a modicum of resources. 
 Community and identity groups consequently become “corporate identities,” which are 
constituted as “forms of group identity that are officially recognized, sanctified, legitimized, and 
accepted by the state and its institutions.”13 The “incorporation” of the corporate identity forges a 
fundamental link between “forms of group identity based on language, ethnicity, religion, and 
culture, as they are experienced by individual members, and forms of group identity that are 
recognized by the state and its institutions as legal or quasi-legal entities, which then confer on 
members of such groups certain rights and privileges.”14 This version of the corporate identity, 
which comes close to effacing distinctions between individual experience and group identity, 
obeys a particular political logic. Namely, corporate identities require their claimants to demand 
public recognition of their essential difference in order to become a corporate identity. This co-
                                     
 12 Yúdice, The Expediency of Culture, 55. 
 13 Seyla Benhabib, “Civil Society and the Politics of Identity and Difference in a Global Context,” in Diversity 
and Its Discontents: Cultural Conflict and Common Ground in Contemporary American Society, ed. Neil J. Smelser 
and Jeffrey C. Alexander (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 298. 
 14 Benhabib, “Civil Society,” 298. 
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constitution (or circularity) is not problematic in itself, but it begs a question that will haunt the 
official multiculturalism-to-come of the 1980s: what is at stake in a political setting that asks 
people to become what they already are, only more so? 
 There are two dimensions to this query. First, the state creates a public and political 
culture that rewards claims to identity among disenfranchised groups. Second, in this political 
culture, such groups must forcefully assert their singularity or individuality vis-à-vis other 
groups, asserting, thereby, their claim to difference. These dimensions exist in tension with one 
another. However different from one another, all identity groups seem functionally equivalent 
insofar as they are constituted as corporate identities, when in fact their only objective common 
ground (what political theory calls a universal) is their shared disenfranchisement and subordi-
nation. If according to its classical anthropological definition, culture is the more or less tangible 
ensemble of ideas, practices, and values, it is the less tangible relation of difference between 
these ensembles that constitutes a new political form.15 Two practical consequences follow that 
will affect profoundly the administration and management of diversity via corporate identities: 
(1) The social field is distributed along an axis of pluralism; and 
(2) There emerges what Daniel Bell called a “revolution of entitlements.”16 
In what follows, we expand on both. 
 Pluralism is an old trope in U.S. discourses of self-identification. Using the motto E 
pluribus unum, pragmatist philosophers William James and John Dewey appealed to the notion 
                                     
 15 Yúdice, The Expediency of Culture, 23. 
 16 Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1978), cited in Benhabib, 
“Civil Society,” 299. 
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in an effort to attenuate anti-immigration sentiment in the 1930s.17 By the 1970s, pluralism 
becomes a key term for cultural-identity politics. Pluralism is also a fundamental tenet of 
liberalism, giving form to the demands society makes of a political system constituted around the 
idea of the “individual” as that society’s ultimate and sacrosanct political unit. By consolidating 
themselves as “corporate identities,” ethno-racial “groups” can articulate demands as coherent, 
bounded individualities and not heterogeneous collectivities. In a sense, then, the pluralism of the 
1970s made individuals of groups, mediating a tension between individual and collectivity 
existing at the heart of liberal democracy. 
 As Chantal Mouffe explains, the systemic primacy of the individual presents an empirical 
limitation to the corporations necessary for democratic political practices: how can democratic 
political practices accommodate the theoretically endless (plural) number of demands, entitle-
ments, interests, and needs of individuals (or, as in the present case, of individual groups)?18 At 
stake is the neutralization of systemic conflict. One solution, apparent in the emergence of 
cultural identity groups, is to accommodate demands of this plural association through rational 
and non-conflictive consensus. In other words, by rationally agreeing that the nation’s already 
                                     
 17 According to Timothy Brennan, pluralism is first theorized within the context of creole nationalisms in Latin 
America and the Caribbean: “A New World pluralism was first theorized by early Caribbean travelers like Jean-
Baptiste du Tertre and Père Labat, and then forged into a political ethic by Sarmiento, Martí and others in the wake 
of the nineteenth-century liberation movements . . . it was this tradition of thought that was—honorably at first—
introduced into North America by the pragmatist philosophers John Dewey and William James in the Gilded Age, to 
stave off anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S. It was then gradually purged of all trace of its foreign origins, to 
become officially institutionalized as the creed of the nation” (Timothy Brennan, “Cosmopolitanism and 
Internationalism,” in Debating Cosmopolitics, ed. Daniele Archibugi [New York: Verso, 2003], 43-44). In 1956 
Horace Kallen elaborated another version of pluralism tolerant of “the commerce of difference” (in Kallen, Cultural 
Pluralism and the American Idea: An Essay in Social Philosophy [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1956]), as Avery Gordon and Christopher Newfield write (Avery Gordon and Christopher Newfield, “White 
Philosophy,” in Identities, ed. Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates, Jr. [Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995], 396). See also the essays in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, 
Citizenship, Community (New York: Verso, 1992). 
 18 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (New York: Routledge, 2005), 11. Kevin Korsyn invokes Mouffe’s analyses 
of democracy in his analyses of the contemporary university (see Korsyn, Decentering Music: A Critique of 
Contemporary Musical Research [New York: Oxford University Press, 2003], particularly chapters 7 and 8). 
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existing plurality (of ethnicities, races, faiths, etc.) must be reflected officially in the institutions 
of the state and the civil society. 
 The interpretive impasse here is whether pluralism constitutes the recognition of a ground 
objectively given and existing prior to the rational agreement or, instead, such recognition 
constitutes a horizon to which liberal democracy aspires. In the complex hermeneutics of the 
politics of diversity, these options co-exist in tension with one another. One points to an objec-
tive pre-existing condition and the other to its potential realization in a more just society of the 
future. Most crucially, pluralism constitutes a form of management of diversity (both pre-
existing and to-come), in which a group’s culture counts as political capital under this new 
system. This requires that culture and not simply “people” be subject to administration. The 
same question arises with respect to culture: is it an objective and pre-existing ground or is this 
ground validated and resignified by political legitimation? We must answer yes in both cases. In 
turn, the construction of what a group’s culture is, what historical events most decisively affect 
its formation, and so on, becomes the terrain over which groups will compete, powerfully intro-
ducing the question of entitlements. The consequences that these changes have for our 
understanding of diversity are as follows: the rational acceptance of pluralism and its legitima-
tion at all political levels creates the general terms both for intelligibility of what it means for the 
nation to be a body politic, made up of diverse cultures, and for the elaboration of projects that 
might best fulfill this diversity. 
 By a “revolution of entitlements,” Bell means not just a proliferation of rightful demands 
within minority identity groups but also the creation of a marketplace-like logic for those 
demands, as well as a transformation in definitions of what constitutes the property of these 
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groups qua cultural identity collectivities. We are most interested in the last two of these defini-
tions of “revolution of entitlements.” 
 Pluralism orders the social field as a non-conflictive accommodation of differences and 
identities. The implication that this accommodation eliminates conflict constitutes pluralism’s 
ethical dimension. But pluralism also functions as a management measure because cultural iden-
tity counts as capital in a political and material economy administered by the state. This is its 
economic dimension. These dimensions are incompatible.19 The former eliminates all adversarial 
relations among groups (as well as neutralizes the more radical forms of resistance to the state). 
The latter animates competition among groups for state welfare (understood broadly as the 
distribution of material resources to the social field as a whole, not in the patronizing terms under 
which welfare would be cast by the right-wing). The politics of cultural identity create an 
economic space compelling individual groups to maximize their specific interests, according to 
the logic of the market. This market logic should not be understood merely as a strategy adopted 
by groups vying to survive or be recognized in the new political economy. Rather, it is absolutely 
co-constitutive of the politics of cultural identity and of the notion that diversity is beneficial to 
the body politic as a whole. 
 Such a competitive market logic might ask what constitutes the greater historical and 
ongoing injury: the brutal institutionalization of racism against blacks under Jim Crow laws and 
the social marginalization of black communities in the contemporary U.S., the dispossession of 
land and social isolation of native Americans, and so on. As we now discuss, when disputes over 
entitlements to higher education enter the juridical terrain in the late 1970s, the very notion of 
                                     
 19 Mouffe, On the Political, 11. 
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what constitutes “genuine diversity” places limitations on how specific a group’s interest can 
actually be. This reflects what will become a constant need for management of this new form of 
political capital—cultural identity—in the interest of that peculiarly pre-existing plurality of U.S. 
society and of the ethical aspiration to true social diversity. The most important ground for the 
management of this diversity is juridical. 
 
III. DIVERSITY AS A JURIDICO-POLITICAL CATEGORY 
 To become a juridico-political category, the state has to take what is called “compelling 
interest” in diversity. We will have much more to say about “compelling state interest,” but for 
now, we offer two questions that unfold along the qualitative/quantitative dyad that historically 
splits (and troubles) thinking about diversity. In what kind of diversity does the state take a 
compelling interest? And if, as we have suggested, diversity acts as a ceaseless, insurrectionary 
“turning apart,” how much diversity can the state be interested in maintaining? Is it possible to 
determine that an institution is adequately diverse? Through what unit of analysis could such a 
claim be made? This section examines these questions through the precedent-setting 1978 
Supreme Court case, University of California Regents v. Allen Bakke (hereafter Bakke),20 
regarded by some as a great compromise, and by others as a vague decision that irrevocably 
muddied the waters for affirmative action for the next thirty years. In what follows, we show 
how, in Bakke, a very particular understanding of “diversity” reconfigures the relationship of 
individual to group. Through Bakke, we show how the Supreme Court stabilizes this “diversity” 
as a properly juridical category. As a mediating term between individual and group, this 
                                     
 20 University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); cited hereafter as Bakke. 
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“diversity” guides the rational and non-conflictive consensus that constitutes pluralism. We 
move slowly and carefully through the case, unpacking the legal logic that subtends both the 
Court’s version of “diversity” and its understanding of pluralism. 
 But first, the facts. In Bakke, the question of the constitutionality of U.C.-Davis Medical 
School’s “special admissions process” precipitated Justice Lewis F. Powell’s landmark decision 
that race-conscious admissions policies will be considered constitutional given that they meet a 
very specific set of standards and conditions. Powell ruled, however, that Davis’ policy was 
unconstitutional. How does this play out? In 1973 and 1974, Davis’ Medical School set aside 
sixteen of its one hundred seats for students accepted through its “special admissions” program. 
According to its application guidelines in 1973, Davis’ special admissions were open to 
“economically and/or educationally disadvantaged” applicants, although Davis never produced a 
formal definition of “disadvantaged.” In 1974 the guidelines were changed to include only 
“minority students,” which in this case encompasses three racial and ethnic groups: African-
American, Native American, and Chicanos.21 Allen Bakke, a white male applicant, applied to 
special admissions in 1973 and 1974. He was rejected in both years, and brings the suit because 
he claims that the special admissions program discriminated against him on the basis of race. The 
California district court sided with Mr. Bakke, deciding that: (a) the special admissions program 
violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (b) U.C.-Davis was required to admit Allen 
Bakke; and (c) U.C.-Davis was forbidden from taking race into account in any future admissions 
decisions.22 
                                     
 21 U.C.-Davis includes Asians when counting minority students enrolled in the medical school, although Asian 
students are not officially included in the special admissions program. 
 22 “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be discriminated under any program or activity receiving federal assistance” 
(cited at http://www.ourdocuments.gov [accessed 14 July 2008]). 
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 The Supreme Court upheld the first two rulings but overturned the third. In his decision, 
Powell (known as a as a master of judicial compromise) balances the “social necessity of 
affirmative action”23 with a meritocratic individualism that from some perspectives looks a lot 
like the individualism deployed in late 1960s electoral politics to shore up “American” values 
along racial lines. Powell’s compromise depends on a very particular construal of the relation 
between the First and Fourteenth Amendments.24 It is the Fourteenth Amendment that holds 
Powell fast to the category of the individual.25 Why? How is individualism yoked to 
constitutionality in Bakke and what are its implications?  
 As one might expect, what constitutes “equal protection” and who is thereby “equally 
protected” has not been interpreted consistently throughout history. The Equal Protection clause, 
for example, was deployed to support segregation until Brown v. Board of Education (herafter 
Brown) initiated a radical change in its interpretation in 1954. As it’s used in Bakke, the Four-
teenth Amendment mandates that all persons be considered as individuals before the law; that 
consideration should not be shaped or inflected by a person’s identification with any particular 
racial group. Nor, on the other hand, should these rights be interpreted relative to differences 
                                     
 23 Robert Post, “Introduction: After Bakke,” Representations 55 (1996), 4. 
 24 When two constitutional values encounter one another in this way, they are called “countervailing interests”; 
in Bakke, as we show shortly, the First Amendment protects academic freedom as a freedom of speech. The First 
Amendment is in a certain sense in U.C.-Davis’ favor insofar as it affirms that the university should be able to admit 
whoever it sees fit on academic grounds. The Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand, guarantees “equal protec-
tion before the law,” and forbids the state to “make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States.” The challenge, here, is to allow the university to continue exercising its 
academic freedoms, while ensuring that that exercise doesn’t abridge the “privileges” and “immunities” of the citi-
zenry. 
 25 Since Brown v. Board of Education, The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been 
interpreted as protecting the rights of individuals, not of groups. The clause mandates that: “States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws” (cited at http://www.usconstitution.net/xconst_Am14.html [accessed 6 
August 2008]). 
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between ethno-racial groups. Does this interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Equal Protection clause place a limit on the market logic of demands articulated through cultural 
difference? This question points toward one of the many endpoints of our analysis, but for now 
we offer two questions whose impact on Bakke is significant. Does the opposition of the unique 
individual to the identification with a racial collectivity mean that the Fourteenth Amendment 
should be interpreted as being color-blind? And secondly, how do we think of race and ethnicity 
under the legal injunction that both ascriptions be considered only through the category of the 
individual? 
 The history of the Fourteenth Amendment is extremely significant here. Under some 
readings, its framers understood this Amendment as protecting the freedoms of the then recently 
freed slaves. In this sense, the Fourteenth was meant to adequate the rights of one racial group to 
those of another; it implicitly divided American society into two racial groups, which Powell 
calls the “two-class theory.” Clearly, under the “two-class theory,” any legislative action based 
on the Fourteenth will act upon racial groups, and not individuals; that is, although intended to 
protect the rights of Black Americans, the Fourteenth accomplishes what Jorge Klor de Alva 
calls “the fusion of person with category.”26 The logic of this fusion, de Alva forcefully points 
out, is at work as early as the seventeenth century, deployed by white Europeans to ontologize 
racial difference. It serves, de Alva continues, to figure American slavery as a natural conse-
quence of the intrinsic character of Africans, making of slavery a social ontology. This same 
fusion haunts the “two-class” model, which paved the way for the “separated but equal before 
the law” logic of segregation, and as we are reminded by the dissenting Justices in Bakke (i.e., 
                                     
 26 Jorge Klor de Alva, “Is Affirmative Action a Christian Heresy?,” Representations 55 (1996), 66. 
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Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun), it was most definitely deployed as such. Brown 
forces a radical reconsideration of both what “equality before the law” should mean, and how 
that equality should be distributed. As is well known, Brown declares that “separate school and 
public facilities of all sorts were inherently unequal and forbidden under the Constitution.”27 Any 
form of (alleged) equality that is deployed in and through the separation of the nation into racial 
groups is thus unconstitutional also. Among its many other consequences, Brown paved the way 
for the individualistic interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that in 1978 becomes so 
essential in Bakke. 
 Accordingly, in his opinion Powell writes: “The guarantee of equal protection cannot 
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of 
another color.”28 Using different evaluative rubrics for persons of different racial groups, as did 
Davis’ “special” and regular admissions tracks, violates the Equal Protection clause. According 
to Powell, the “special admissions” track isolates individuals of different ethno-racial groups 
from competition with one another and thereby functions like a quota system. Under this logic, 
U.C.-Davis treated Allen Bakke as a “white male,” and not as an individual variously qualified 
or unqualified for success in medical school. 
 So far, however, it is not yet clear how individuality and race function together. Justices 
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun assert that the adherence to individualistic mandate of 
the Fourteenth Amendment does not demand recourse to judicial color-blindness, although 
Powell’s rendering of the Fourteenth implies that it does. Their opinions, which we quote at 
                                     
 27 Bakke, 45. 
 28 Bakke, 13. 
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length below, point to the Fourteenth Amendment’s uneasy relationship with history, which even 
their more flexible, contingent construal of the Amendment cannot efface.  
 
[C]laims that law must be “color-blind” or that the datum of race is no longer relevant to 
public policy must be seen as aspiration rather than as a description of reality. This is not 
to denigrate aspiration; for reality rebukes us that race has too often been used by those 
who would stigmatize and oppress minorities. Yet, we cannot—and, as we shall demon-
strate, need not under our Constitution or Title VI, which merely extends the constraints 
of the 14th Amendment to private parties who receive federal funds—let color blindness 
become myopia which masks the reality that man “created equal” have been treated 
within our lifetime as inferior both by the law and by their fellow citizens.29  
 
Color-blindness is tantamount to disavowing histories of racial oppression; and yet, these 
Justices describe the “equal protection” described by the Amendment as being grounded in (or 
modeled on) no particular historical present. The Fourteenth describes an ideal and indeterminate 
future to which we must aspire. “Reality” here—which could be taken to mean analysis of both 
historical and contemporary race relations—doesn’t mediate or condition that aspiration as much 
as it simply compels us to continue aspiring with renewed strength. These Justices hardly “deni-
grate aspiration”; rather, they implicitly frame it as the most pertinent hermeneutic for legislation 
pertaining to ethno-racial equality. According to this passage, the law functions as an affective, 
hopeful injunction and not as a means of assessing the historical present from which we move 
into a more just future. In other words, these judges imply that the law has no positive relation to 
history; the best any interpreter of the law can do is not obscure or disavow history. As we detail 
below, this will have significant implications for Powell’s understanding of the relationship of 
the university to history. 
                                     
 29 Bakke, 45. 
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 Powell produces a different set of problems in his construal of the relationship between 
history and the law. The version of the Fourteenth expounded by Brennan et al. should be flexi-
ble enough to accommodate changing relations between “minority” and “majority.” Similarly, 
Powell recognizes the historical necessity of moving beyond the “two-class theory” that subtends 
the Fourteenth in its original framing.30 This said, Powell claims that the terms “majority” and 
“minority” are so historically contingent that to use them as axes for constitutional interpretation 
“undermines the chances for consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to the 
next.”31 Implying that historical legacies of discrimination are more flexible and transient than do 
White, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, Powell goes on to claim that “the concepts of 
“majority” and “minority” necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political judgments.”32 
Powell’s deference to contingencies in political judgment and not, for example, socioeconomic 
conditions, is telling; were he to consider socioeconomic disparity, perhaps Powell might not 
think “minority” status to be so temporary. And yet, the notion that “minority” status is deter-
mined by political judgment is consistent with the culturalist logic of the 1960s and ’70s. 
Although history may impact how groups articulate their status to the state, those same historical 
processes should not, under Powell, impact the interpretation of the Constitution. We arrive at 
the crux of the politics of cultural identity as they intersect with the juridical logic that most 
profoundly grounds “diversity” as a socio-political imperative in the U.S.: cultural sovereignty 
cannot win any group special consideration before the law. 
                                     
 30 The early cases in which the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment was at issue confronted the U.S. 
“legacy of slavery and racial discrimination” (Shelley v. Kramer, 1948; Brown v. Board of Education, 1954; Hills v. 
Gautreaux, 1976) in which “majority” meant white and minority meant “African American.” What Bakke requires, 
then, is either an in interpretation of the Fourteenth that moves beyond the “two-class theory” or a new judicial 
precedent as regards what groups count as minorities. 
 31 Bakke, 16. 
 32 Bakke, 15. 
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 And so, Powell has to craft a definition of diversity that somehow transcends its own 
historical moment while remaining relevant to it. He defers to a familiar political category in 
order to accomplish this. Remaining consistent with the Equal Protection clause, the individual 
appears once again as the only category through which diversity can be defined. This satisfies the 
quasi-ahistorical quality of Powell’s constitutional hermeneutic. Robert Post reminds us that 
“there are significant Western traditions—for example, Kantian and Christian traditions—in 
which the values of individual autonomy are understood as standing outside history.”33 The 
version of individualism that Powell deploys here, however, opposes the political logic under 
which ethno-racial groups become individuals in a marketplace of needs and demands; rather, 
here ethno-racial identification becomes just one of many qualities that constitute the singular, 
unique individual. 
 Patricia Williams strikingly exemplifies this logic when she writes, “while being black 
has been the most powerful social attribution in my life, it is only one of a number of governing 
narratives or presiding fictions by which I am constantly reconfiguring myself in the world.”34 In 
this sense, race becomes one of many axes along which Williams’ practices of living are orga-
nized, but needs to be understood not as an immutable category but as refracted through other 
such axes. Williams’ constant self-figuring implies a self-determined agent capable of surveying 
and assessing the totality of her possible lived “narratives” and “fictions,” and so able to adjust 
her practice of everyday life accordingly. 35 
                                     
 33 Post, “Introduction: After Bakke,” 4. 
 34 Patricia Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), quoted 
in François Cusset, French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the 
United States, trans. Jeff Fort (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 139–40. 
 35 Symbolic displacements, of the kind articulated to the notion of “subject position” that Williams mobilizes and 
much in vogue in the humanities’ critical vocabulary of the 1980s and 1990s, are not necessarily material displace-
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  Williams’ self-description offers a markedly appropriate example of what Powell calls 
“genuine diversity.” What does this mean? Powell describes two possible concepts of “diversity” 
relevant to higher education. These are “simple ethnic diversity” and “genuine diversity.” When 
assessed in the juridical realm, only “genuine diversity” is constitutionally permissible; accord-
ing to Powell, “simple ethnic diversity” is essentially quantitative. The latter version of diversity 
is staked on how many students of various ethno-racial groups enroll in a given institution. In 
practice, “simply ethnic diversity” assumes that an applicant’s race describes her most salient 
contribution to an educational institutional, and thus collapses individual identity into group 
membership. In Williams’ case, an admissions policy based on “simple diversity” would not be 
attentive to the “narratives” and “fiction” that impact her orientation around, toward, and within 
blackness. The U.C.-Davis admissions policy, according to Powell, is oriented toward “simple 
ethnic diversity,” and as such isolated persons from different ethnic groups from competition 
with one another. This violates the preservation of individual rights mandated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The bottom line: simply enrolling minority students does not equal achieving 
educational diversity. 
 “Genuine diversity,” on the other hand, does not exclude race and ethnicity, but mandates 
that race be considered alongside qualities like special skill sets and talents, professional goals, 
areas of interest, service or work experience, socioeconomic status, and geography. It is 
supposed to be a flexible term, whose constitutive qualities a single enumeration cannot exhaust. 
Although Powell is unwilling to allow historical contingency to inflect his interpretation of the 
Constitution, the model of diversity that he crafts through that interpretation is itself flexible and 
                                     
ments. Not coincidentally, these displacements are voiced by a predominantly middle-class academic sector, 
presumably able to strategically displace to this or that position.  
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open to social and political change. Under the logic of “genuine diversity,” any unique quality of 
any individual could be thought of as “contributing” to diversity in higher education. Race and 
ethnicity can be taken into account in admissions decisions, but only as one quality among many 
others. The only “entitlement to difference” in this logic operates between individuals—not 
between groups that function like individuals. Diversity, then, appears as less a force that drives 
an insurrectionary “turning-apart” than as a way of simply describing the infinite differences that 
make individuals different from one another. The components of Powell’s diversity are synthe-
sized, or are rendered coherent insofar as they are thought to constitute the individual qua 
individual, regardless of her identification with a particular ethno-racial group. 
 Powell’s responsibility in Bakke is not only to theorize a “diversity” compliant with the 
Constitution; he needs to show that constitutional admissions policies can be built around 
“genuine diversity.” He doesn’t create this policy ex nihilo, but rather imports the admissions 
policy of one of the nation’s most prestigious universities into the juridical realm. Harvard 
University’s version of race-conscious undergraduate admissions becomes the new model for 
affirmative action in higher education.36 Under the Harvard policy Powell adopts, race and 
ethnicity can be treated as a “plus” in a particular applicant’s file, but should not be a priori 
regarded as the most important factor of her application. Nor should race and ethnicity become 
the dominant hermeneutic through which an applicant’s other qualities are judged. This is vague, 
indeed, but it is in precisely this vagary that Powell’s great compromise on Bakke lies. How does 
this work? In an admissions decision, Powell mandates that “the particular qualities of any appli-
cant [should be] placed on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily accorded 
                                     
 36 Powell authorizes this without considering the differences between public and private universities and without 
exploring the subtle ways in which diversity might function differently in an undergraduate context versus a gradu-
ate or pre-professional school. 
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the same weight.”37 An application process has two parts: first, “equal footing” is established, 
and secondly, those qualities are ranked hierarchically, or put simply, “unequally weighted.” 
When placed on equal footing, any number of an applicant’s unique qualities can potentially be 
decisive in terms of her admission. According to this logic, race could be placed on equal footing 
with, for example, exceptional musical talent or unique work experience. When weighted, 
however, any one of these qualities, including race and ethnicity, can then again become 
decisive; indeed, race can only become decisive in the second, “weighted” phase. The first phase 
requires an admissions officer to assess the scope of an individual’s unique qualities, thus 
ensuring the individualized review required by the Fourteenth Amendment, while the second 
phase makes race-conscious admissions possible. Powell has thus produced a constitutional 
model for simultaneously color-blind and race-conscious admissions. 
 We opened this section by asking how diversity becomes a juridical category. How does 
the state articulate its interest in educational diversity? After having examined the case in some 
detail, we now want to return to this question, with special emphasis on the judicial precedents 
that buttress Powell’s decision. This requires a quick review of a legal process known as “strict 
scrutiny,” which consists of two tracks of inquiry. These are called “compelling state interest” 
and “narrow tailoring.” Strict scrutiny is used whenever the state or a recipient of state funds (a 
public university, for example) creates legislation or policy that classifies individual according to 
their race or ethnicity. Because such classifications have historically been used with discrimina-
tory intent, they are known as “suspect classifications.” One of the earliest and most famous 
deployments of strict scrutiny appears in two cases that contest the constitutionality of Japanese-
Americans during the Second World War. Powell quotes the following passages from 
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CIMINI AND MORENO: ON DIVERSITY 
 
GAMUT 2/1 (2009) 143 
Hirabayashi v. United States (1943)38 and Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States (1944),39 
respectively: 
 
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature 
odious to a free people, whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. 
 
All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial are immediately 
suspect. This is not to say that all such restrictions are constitutional. It is to say that 
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.40 
 
To read in these statements both the validation of equality and suspicion of racial classification 
seems strange, not only because both these cases occur exactly ten years before Brown, but also 
because both cases uphold the constitutionality of the Japanese internment. Why? It was first 
determined that the state’s interest in wartime security was a compelling enough interest to 
justify the suspension of a racial groups’ civil rights. Compelling state interest is determined by 
weighing the state’s interest in maintaining a policy against “an individual’s constitutional rights 
that are affected by the law.”41 Once compelling state interest is established, narrow tailoring—
strict scrutiny’s second test—enters the scene. Narrow tailoring tests the means by which the 
state achieves its compelling interest; if a program is narrowly tailored, then its procedural means 
comes as close as possible to serving exclusively its stated end. A narrowly-tailored procedure 
must be the “least intrusive means” of meeting a goal.42 This definition sits uncomfortably along-
side the cases in which they were developed. Was internment truly the “least intrusive means” of 
ensuring national security amidst the “presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members 
                                     
 38 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 39 Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); cited hereafter as Korematsu. 
 40 Both cited in Bakke, 13. 
 41 Henry Campbell Black and Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edn. (New York: Thomson/West, 
2004). 
 42 Bakke, 13. 
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of [Japanese origin]?”43 This question, based in a much larger critique of the curtailment of civil 
liberties in the name of national security, implies that the policy of internment was not narrowly 
tailored, and therefore should have been declared unconstitutional. 
 Although individualized, Powell’s “genuine diversity” still to a certain extent relies on 
racial classifications, and therefore it must survive the two tests that constitute strict scrutiny. 
The U.C.-Davis special admission program, of course, does not. The question, then, becomes: 
does the state’s interest in educational diversity outweigh any infractions against an individual’s 
civil rights that might follow from its pursuit? Powell must now assess what diversity can and 
cannot effectively do for the state, and this assessment must itself unfold along strict scrutiny’s 
two parallel tracks. For Powell, strict scrutiny shockingly strikes down one of the classic argu-
ment in favor of affirmative action, which Judith Butler formulates as “the notion that a group 
has suffered historically and therefore deserves admission as a ways of compensating for past 
discrimination.”44 This finding addresses U.C.-Davis’ claim that its special admissions responds 
to precisely the past “societal discrimination” that Butler invokes. For Powell, “societal” and 
“historical” discrimination are so multifarious and pervasive that it’s impossible for a single 
institutional to narrowly-tailor means for remuneration. The only way that an institutional could 
constitutionally compensate for past discrimination is to show that such compensation responds 
to specific instances of discrimination in that institution’s own history. It is thus constitutional to 
develop policy that rights past discrimination in the institutions that constitute the social field, 
although it is impossible, in Powell’s purview, for those institutions to act directly in or on the 
social field as such. 
                                     
 43 Korematsu, 3. 
 44 Judith Butler, “An Affirmative View,” Representations 55 (1996), 81. 
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 Yet again, Powell cleaves affirmative action from history. This has ramifications for 
“diversity” as such; that is, if “diversity” is an institution’s goal, then that “diversity,” and the 
means by which it is attained, must be yoked to that institution’s historical specificity. Powell 
follows this formula when he ultimately claims that the state has a compelling interest in the 
educational mission of its universities. He thereby tethers diversity to such a mission, which he 
describes as follows: “it is the business of the university to provide the atmosphere that is most 
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation.” A “genuinely diverse” student body, Powell 
decides, maximizes this essential “speculation, experimentation and creation.”45 
 This “business of the university” is framed in and through the so-called “four academic 
freedoms.” Under the First Amendment, these freedoms protect the university’s right to deter-
mine which applicants will best fulfill this mission. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957),46 
Judge Henry Frankenfurter described the four academic freedoms as the university’s right “to 
determine on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught and 
who may be admitted to study.”47 By invoking Sweezy, Powell produces a workable but some-
what uneasy marriage of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On the face of it, this seems 
simple enough: the university is free to admit anyone (and to develop race-conscious policy) as 
long as that policy is built on individualized review. “Genuine diversity” doesn’t prescribe how 
                                     
 45 Bakke, 22. 
 46 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); cited hereafter as Sweezy. A self-proclaimed “socialist” and 
“classical Marxist,” Sweezy was investigated under the 1953 Joint Resolution Related to the Investigation of Sub-
versive Activities, which authorizes the attorney general to act “on his own motion” upon information about 
subversive persons and activities “presently located within the state.” Sweezy was asked to turn over to the attorney 
general his lecture notes for classes at the University of New Hampshire. He refused, and was held in contempt of 
court. Sweezy refused, however, not by invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, for to do so would be tantamount to 
admitting that the lecture notes were themselves incriminating. Rather, Sweezy withheld the notes under the First 
Amendment, claiming that “right to lecture” is protected as a freedom of speech. Sweezy ultimately produces the 
four academic freedoms, although the case clearly rests on the freedom to “determine what may be taught.” 
 47 Cited in Bakke, 22. 
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“unequal weight” should be distributed and, importantly, the First Amendment preserves the 
university’s right to make this decision. But a closer look shows something strange at work here. 
When Powell claims that diversity enhances the educational mission of the university, we might 
ask whose education is thereby enhanced. Could it be that Powell articulates diversity’s benefits 
in terms of those who would have access to the university without race-conscious admissions? 
That he finds diversity to be consistent with an educational mission that precedes this debate by 
over twenty years implies that we should answer this question in the affirmative. Powell’s 
“genuine diversity” does nothing to transform the educational mission of the university; diversity 
simply becomes another way in which the university can better fulfill its mission.  
 Now consistent with a mission that precedes it by over twenty years, this is a diversity 
that “diverges,” it seems, from nothing. The reason why universities should be diverse, Powell 
implies, is because the social world for which it prepares its graduates is diverse.48 Under this 
logic, the university must become adequate to the social world in which it operates. But, does 
“genuine diversity,” yoked as it is to the academy, truly reflect the modalities of difference that 
constitute the social field? The next two sections work at this question. Yes, the university can 
address itself to that field only on the issue of “diversity.” But the university cannot directly 
intervene in “societal discrimination” or address itself to its history. To divorce diversity from 
discrimination is, to a large extent, to sever diversity from history. The university can address a 
“diverse” social world, but it cannot address a “discriminatory” social world. The relationship, in 
Bakke, between diversity and discrimination becomes increasingly unclear. 
                                     
 48 In the following decade, this dictum would become part of a cosmopolitan vision, as this statement by Henry 
Louis Gates reflects: “to reform core curriculums to account for the comparable eloquence of the African, the Asian 
and the Middle Eastern traditions, is to begin to prepare our students for their roles as citizens of a world culture, 
educated through a truly human notion of the humanities” (Henry Louis Gates, “Whose Canon Is It, Anyway?,” New 
York Times Book Review [26 February 1989]: 1, 44–45). 
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IV. DIVERSIFYING THE SMT  
 Powell’s great compromise requires that he be prescriptive with respect to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but not under the First Amendment. That is, he makes no recommendations about 
how an educationally diverse university should function—at the level of hiring, curriculum, 
classroom ethos, etc. He does this so that he doesn’t infringe on academic freedom; it is left to 
historians of diversity, then, to assess how the academy has inhabited these freedoms to address 
diversity in the thirty years since Bakke. In a curricular sense, for example, we could in any 
number of ways narrate the institution of “ethnic” programs in the late 1960s, followed by the 
rise of multiculturalism, identity-centric U.S.-style cultural studies, postcolonial studies, and the 
study of globalization throughout the 1980s and ’90s. But our task here is to examine the speci-
ficity of music studies’ response to the adequation processes on which Powell’s Bakke decision 
rests. We proceed in that direction by examining the work of the Committee for Diversity, with 
special attention to the relation between the university and the social field implied by its work of 
the last ten years. 
 Founded in 1996, the Committee has held annual sessions at SMT national conferences 
since 1997, alone and in conjunction with sister societies (i.e., the AMS and Society for Ethno-
musicology). The form and content of these sessions echo the trends in academic treatments of 
diversity listed above. Indeed, the Committee pursued a very ambitious agenda in a very 
compressed time period. The SMT, however, began such projects well after the fires of the 
Culture Wars—stoked in the 1980s by fights over multiculturalism—had subsided significantly 
both inside and outside the academy. It is as if the SMT subsisted in its own sphere within the 
humanities in general, where these trends motivated disciplinary debate and spurred methodo-
logical self-reflection. Music studies were, in a word, late to the table. This untimeliness partly 
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accounts for the unusual mixture of approaches to diversity the Committee has advanced to carry 
out its stated outreach mission. 
 At its founding in 1996, the Committee’s first mission statement noted that “only five of 
the 126 faculty teaching theory at historically black institutions are members of SMT,” and that 
“of the ten African-American theorists sent to us on a list by a colleague in the AMS, all of 
whom have doctorates and university positions, only four are members of SMT.” The Commit-
tee’s stated mission became active “[inclusion of] minorities in the SMT.” This injunction, 
however, requires (at least implicitly) that the Committee ask what means would best accomplish 
this kind of inclusion? The answer, at least in this inaugural moment, emphasized analytical 
canon-expansion and inclusiveness, attending to “music theory and recent music from outside 
the art-music mainstream.” “Expanding the Canon” became the title for five of its annual 
meetings, in 1997–2001. 
 But note two important aspects of this inaugural moment. First, the Committee offered 
only informal statistical data about African-American membership, although its goal is the inclu-
sion of “minorities” in a more general sense. Second, the Committee clearly delineated music 
analysis as the discipline’s main project; the musical texts meant for analysis may change, but 
analysis itself doesn’t necessarily have to. The first aspect is understandable considering the 
persistent racial binary in the U.S., expressed in black/white terms. As Justice Powell’s notion of 
“two-class theory” reminds us, the edge between the parts of this binary was the frontline of 
most disputes about racial division, societal marginalization, and institutional exclusion. 
Accordingly, it may have made sense to exemplify the need for diversification through its most 
visible and central dynamic. 
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 The second aspect bears closer scrutiny. It was not clear whether by virtue of their ethno-
cultural background, African-American theorists, or theorists from minority groups, might have 
diversified analytical practices, or if instead analytical practices might have remained stable 
while its practitioners became more ethno-racially diverse. Indeed, the Committee’s mission 
statement does not address this problematic. More importantly, neither model would be without 
challenges. On the one hand, the first assumption would ascribe an originary difference to 
African-American theorists, redolent of Kofi Agawu’s forceful critique of presumed African 
musico-epistemological difference in the disciplinary logic of much ethnomusicology.49 On the 
other hand, it’s possible that without substantive changes in analytical practices or a reconfigura-
tion of analytical practice to musical practices—which perhaps partly account for why many 
African-American theorists were disinclined to join the SMT—these theorists might have no 
reason to join now. 
 Though aimed at “inclusion,” these two hypothetical scenarios racialize African-
American theorists in very particular ways. Are less-fraught inclusion strategies possible? 
Perhaps a more inclusive approach to objects of study (repertoires produced by minority musi-
cians, for instance) might improve the situation. We don’t know, obviously. According to 
notions prevalent in ethnic studies, minorities tend to be responsive to the cultural production of 
their own. Likewise, incorporating speakers from previously marginalized ethno-racial groups 
might have offered what advocates call “models” for younger minority scholars, interested in the 
field but unable to find proper mentoring. But adequating the discipline to the social world vis-à-
vis Bakke requires the Committee and the SMT to consider not only how that world becomes 
                                     
 49 Kofi V. Agawu, Representing African Music: Postcolonial Queries, Notes, Positions (New York: Routledge, 
2003). 
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intelligible in and through the discipline of music theory, but also how the discipline 
communicates with the social field to which it aims to become adequate. What we find here are 
two interlocking problems: one of legibility and another of enunciation. And yet, lurking behind 
the double challenge is one of the questions guiding this article: how much diversity is enough? 
We begin by elucidating some responses to these challenges in the Committee’s programming 
from 1997 forward. 
 The Committee’s sessions have alternated two basic kinds of programming.50 One is 
cosmopolitan and highlights a particular world-geographical region paired with one salient 
musical dimension (Africa/rhythm, 1998; Java and Bali/melodic stratification, 1999; Middle 
East/scale and tonal-systems theory, 2005). On two occasions (1998 and 1999), issues of cross-
cultural influence with the West are discussed, and there is significant collaboration with 
scholars in ethnomusicology, as well as with scholars based in other continents invited specially 
to the sessions. 
 The other kind of programming is more eclectic. Questions of cultural contact precipitate, 
in certain cases, experiments in analytic methods new to music theory, while ethnographic and 
hermeneutic approaches point to discourses of resistance—some immanent to the musical texts, 
others elaborated in discussion with composers and audiences. This said, however, the content of 
the sessions discussed below doesn’t settle easily into clear categories, although we detect in this 
work a common concern with the analysis of cross-cultural signification. After setting off with a 
decidedly music-analytic agenda in 1997, session programs make a turn toward questions of 
cultural contact and conflict (Self–Other relations, 2000; cross-cultural symbolism, 2001; glob-
                                     
 50 No information for the 2003 and 2004 meetings is publicly available. 
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alization and postcolonianism, 2002). Music theorists, historical musicologists, and ethno-
musicologists appear together in these sessions. In 2001 linguistic anthropologist Michael 
Silverstein’s categories for cross-cultural textual symbolism analysis serves as a general frame 
for four different analytical methodologies (see Appendix 3). While textuality constitutes a 
common thread for the presenters, Rao and Wong invoke discourses of resistance, whereas 
Bruns and Bruhl do not. Wong invokes composer and audience ethnography in support of her 
claims on behalf of corporeality, while Rao locates signals of anti-colonial resistance, trans-
national experience, and diasporic position in Chen’s scores. 
 But what about the first call, in 1996, to reach out to African-American scholars? 
Because diversity operates first and foremost within the political space of the nation, wouldn’t it 
make sense to focus on African-American music making and thought? Wouldn’t it also be feasi-
ble to investigate the immense musical repertoire and sonic knowledge of the Black Atlantic and 
the African diaspora the world over? Although the call then was to engage actively minority 
scholars in the U.S., the Committee showed a robust ecumenical interest in a wider geopolitical 
territory. The cosmopolitan spirit of the 1998, 1999, and 2005 sessions is in step with the 
concerns with Orientalism, globalization, and postcolonialism in the 2000, 2001, and 2002 
meetings. The 2000 meeting, the largest ever in North American music studies, was suffused 
with discourse and symbolism of inclusiveness and multiple intersections across sub-disciplines. 
In the published list of abstracts of all meetings (1997–2007, except for 2003–04), a total of six 
papers out of thirty-two deal exclusively with African-American musicians and/or musical-
cultural issues. The other papers that address U.S.-specific issues constellate around panethnicity 
(“the development of bridging organizations and solidarities among subgroups of ethnic collec-
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tivities that are often seen as [racially] homogeneous by outsiders”), at times infused with 
feminism, gender, and sexuality studies.51 These sessions appear to conform more to a multicul-
tural assembly similar to the Committee’s first session in 1997. But still, the initial focus on 
African-American membership of 1996 seems lost. 
 In the spirit of multiculturalism, the Committee’s inaugural 1997 session was an exuber-
ant display of diverse approaches, with nine presenters and one respondent (see Appendix 4). 
The ten participants were evenly divided along gender lines. Two were African-American, three 
Asian or Asian-American, four white-American, and one white Hispanic. As a whole, the papers 
emphasized practical demonstration of various analytical objects and methodologies and musical 
repertoires. Largely comparative, this inaugural session collectively demonstrated how to intro-
duce a variety of analytic objects into the undergraduate classroom. What is at stake, it seems, is 
the development of a pedagogy that widens students’ understanding of music–culture relations. 
If the 2000–02 sessions will implicitly broaden the musico-political phenomena legible through 
music theory’s epistemological grid, then the 1997 session implicitly asserted that the broadness 
of its critical purview was not only pedagogically valuable but feasible. Thus, one group of 
papers engaged comparative work, bringing musical examples from often juxtaposed non-
canonic repertoires under a single theory or compositional technique. Of the more explicitly 
pedagogically oriented papers, one combined Javanese, Asante, and South Indian musics in a 
holistic aural skills demonstration, while another focused on African-American composers 
(Adolphus Hailstork and Alvin Singleton) but did not emphasize any particular analytical model. 
                                     
 51 As defined by David Lopez and Yen Le Espiritu (“Panethnicity in the United States: A Theoretical Frame-
work,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 13 [1990], 219–20), cited in Michael Omi, “Racialization in the Post-Civil Rights 
Era,” in Mapping Multiculturalism, ed. Avery Gordon and Christopher Newfield (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996), 180. Five such panethnicities operate within the ethnoracial regime of U.S. society: Euro-
American, African American, Native American, Asian American, and Latino. 
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One paper highlighted timbre as a marginal element in music theory and analysis, using the 
music of James Brown as a case study, and still another a paper explored the mnemonic potential 
of “unusual musical examples” (by The Beatles and Berio) to introduce selected twentieth-
century musical concepts. Another addressed a classic U.S. cultural-studies issues—race and 
representation—advancing an analytic approach to intersubjectivity in popular and modern 
music drawn from the “ethics of care” of second-wave feminist theory and pedagogy. 
 In the main, the 1997 session did not replicate the political model of cultural identity 
informing academic discourse of diversity. But neither did it set forth a robust program defining 
how the discipline might resonate with the complex politics that made diversity an institutional 
and institutionalized imperative in the first place. What it unwittingly did, we think, was to 
demonstrate in its very practice how difficult it is to adequate the practice of analysis, at the core 
of music theory’s pedagogy, to the social field in general. One other thing was also certain: this 
session did what its title promised, and expanded the canon. 
 In general, canon expansion, particularly incorporating previously ignored or marginal-
ized repertoires, was long a key strategy in the promotion of ethno-cultural pluralism in the 
academy. Canon expansion meant the incorporation of excluded histories and demanded coming 
to terms with their complex narratives and their ongoing effects on contemporary life. Further, 
the overall process entailed the articulation of particular identity formations to the historical 
record, taking the form of recuperative history in its initial stages. The move that accompanies 
this recuperation entails the development of hermeneutic strategies that probe the historical 
record for signs of the power struggles immanent to those histories. In a deconstructive 
perspective, a “canon” can only be defined by what it excludes; this essential yet excluded part 
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become what Henry Staten calls the canon’s “constitutive outside.”52 To argue, then, for the 
inclusion of a previously excluded text is not simply to advocate that something new be added to 
the canon; rather, it is to change the terms through which the canon itself is constituted. Under 
this logic, “canon expansion” becomes quite a contentious practice, and indeed it was hotly 
debated as such during the 1980s. And yet, little or no controversy accompanied this move 
within the SMT in the late 1990s. In the Committee’s orientation toward canonicity, new objects 
of analysis did not displace the existing canon or necessarily challenge its values. Consequently, 
the 1997 session saw little debate about the possibility that music theory’s corpus of great works 
might be compromised by their status as accomplices in white European or Anglo-American, 
masculine forms of power. 
 A similar neutrality arises in the case of analytical/methodological expansion. Consider 
the following case: in a well-known article, musicologist Robert Walser critiques the use of 
analytical approaches that compare jazz with western art music with the aim of elevating jazz to 
art music status.53 Walser cites Gunther Schuller’s motivic analyses of Sonny Rollins’ improvi-
sation as such an exercise. Rollins’ creative accomplishment is largely measured by the degree to 
which his use of motivic development parallels similar practices in canonic composers such as 
Beethoven or Brahms. In sum, following a classical Foucauldian formulation, Walser implies 
that knowledge production is inseparable from the establishment and maintenance of power hier-
archies; analytical tools developed by white, male theorists to understand mostly white male 
composers’ works can be fitted for the analysis of jazz, but they carry problematic ideological 
consequences. By contrast, theorist Keith Waters simply juxtaposed Coltrane to Harbison in 
                                     
 52 Henry Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984). 
 53 Robert Walser, “Out of Notes: Signification, Interpretation, and the Problem of Miles Davis,” Musical 
Quarterly 77/2 (1993): 343–65. 
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order to illustrate how a particular way of organizing intervallic content and conceptualizing its 
sonic organization (that is, by pc sets) could help explain some structural aspects of these musi-
cians’ work to undergraduate students. Whatever ideological outcomes might have been at play 
did not affect Waters’ practical demonstration. 
 Issues of ideological neutrality with respect to canon formation as well as analytical/ 
methodological expansion bring up two questions: 
(1) Whether or not the SMT’s pragmatic concern with the production of music-analytical knowl-
edge may be indifferent to the politics of knowledge production in general; and 
(2) Whether the function of this knowledge in realizing the Committee’s plans for diversification 
serves purely academic interests or serves instead as a liaison between the academy and soci-
ety in general—which, as we remember, was a decisive dimension in the judicial arguments 
about diversity. 
  In the early 1990s, Peter Erikson identifies a form of multiculturalism that he calls a 
“pluralism structured in dominance;”54 that is, a promotion of diversity that doesn’t upend, 
challenge, or critique major hierarchies or dominant values. A certain interpretation of Bakke 
might identify Powell’s “genuine diversity” as an example of “pluralism structured in domi-
nance,” insofar it retains a meritocratic individualism as it dominant value. Under this logic, 
although concerned with diversity in a sense, the Committee of 1997 simply went about its 
analytical business regardless of its potential complicity with preexisting orders. Was the 
absence of polemics about canon and methodology expansion a symptom of the lack of a true 
self-reflective exercise about disciplinary method? 
                                     
 54 Peter Erickson, “What Multiculturalism Means,” Transition 55 (1992): 105–14. 
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 A quick look at music studies’ manifold disciplinary and methodological reorientations 
of the last thirty years makes the absence of such a polemic, well, just that much stranger. One 
thinks, for instance, of Joseph Kerman’s 1985 call for a critical practice that might shake musi-
cology from what he saw as its positivistic slumber and music theory from its formalist 
infatuation.55 Consider also Susan McClary’s controversially received work of 1991, which 
contextualized music in relation to gender and sexuality.56 Because of these interventions, these 
fields and disciplines saw themselves as radically reconfiguring their predominant forms of 
knowledge production. McClary's work, for example, extended the domain of what is knowable 
about a musical work through a combination of formal analysis and hermeneutics.57 Music 
studies see themselves as being placed consequently in their relation, as institutions, to cultural 
or social formations at various scales. 
 As globalization and postcoloniality become concerns for music studies, a similar self-
reflexive upheaval in anthropology also becomes relevant. For anthropology, back in the 1980s, 
this amounted to no less than a rethinking of “West and the rest” as the structuring relation of 
cultural knowledge.58 In their typically immanentist fashion, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
update and characterize this change in the representation of cultural difference twenty years later 
                                     
 55 Joseph Kerman, Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1985). 
 56 Susan McClary, Feminine Endings: Music, Gender and Sexuality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991). 
 57 The SMT did engage these polemics in the panel at the 1995 joint meeting of the AMS and SMT, “Contempo-
rary Theory and the New Musicology.” Arguably the most polemical paper there, by V. Kofi Agawu (published as 
“Analyzing Music under the New Musicological Regime,” Music Theory Online 2/4 (1996), http://mto. 
societymusictheory.org/issues/mto.96.2.4/mto.96.2.4.agawu.html), focused on refusing the potential encroachment 
of new musicology upon music theory. 
 58 This crisis becomes relevant to the 2000 and 2002 sessions of the Committee, on Self/Other relations and 
Postcolonialism and Globalization, respectively. In anthropology, classic texts of this debate include James Clifford 
and George E. Marcus (eds.), Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1986); and James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Litera-
ture, and Art (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988). 
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as follows: “Cultural difference must be conceived in itself, as singularity, without any such 
foundation in the other.”59 This imperative precipitates a serious and ongoing reconsideration of 
how to represent others ethically, not only in an ethnographic context but also in the general 
address musicology makes to “society.” Kerman’s critical musicology begins to account for 
music’s function in the wider social field while the New Musicology responds to its own 
imperative to reveal the inscription of constructions of gender and sexual difference in the 
production of knowledge about music.60 In reconsidering ethics (anthropology), method (musi-
cology), or subject matter (New Musicology), these fields and disciplines experienced radical 
change. In its 1997 session programming, the Committee did address each of these concerns: an 
ethical dimension of inclusion, a methodological dimension in its comparative analytical work, 
and an innovative dimension in its introduction of subjects similar to those of the New 
Musicology. 
 In this respect, then, the Committee seems very consistent with the styles of academic 
politicization deployed by its sister disciplines. And yet, a different, still more self-consciously 
“political” rhetoric appears in the programming at the turn of the century. Beginning in 2000, the 
program abstracts read as follows: “the four participants . . . offer work that challenges the 
hegemonic Western aesthetics of much current musicological and ethnographic writing.” The 
2002 program abstract raises the stakes: 
 
Over the past two decades there has been an on-going effort among music scholars to 
diversify their modes of address and modes of music analyses [sic], and to learn to speak 
more adequately to the constituencies they speak for. This has resulted in the gradual 
                                     
 59 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: Penguin, 
2004), 125. 
 60 New Musicology’s concerns extend beyond gender and sexuality, of course; here we take McClary’s work as 
an exemplar of a certain kind of perceived academic radicalism. The work of other scholars could equally serve—
for instance, that of Lawrence Kramer, Ruth Subotnik, or Gary Tomlinson. 
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stretching of disciplinary boundaries to include hitherto submerged and occluded voices, 
as well as the challenging of certain hierarchies of knowledge and values. This special 
session aims to further these discussions. Careful examination of the dismembered past 
and the discursive present is necessary in order to make sense of the gaps and ruptures of 
the postcolonial condition. The voluminous flow of global capital has been accompanied 
by an unprecedented movement of peoples, technologies, and information across previ-
ously impermeable borders. Corollary to this phenomenon, music has become a 
particularly complex, unstable site of cross-cultural meanings and interactions.61 
 
The discourse of academic activism here is unmistakable, reflecting a passionate commitment to 
some political dimension of music studies. Like diversity in Bakke, the Committee’s politics here 
emerge through a process of adequation. The Committee conceives itself as doing double work: 
it shoulders an ethical responsibility to speak for others, while simultaneously seeking ethical 
ways to speak back to those spoken for. This adequation process is more airtight that the one 
implied by Bakke. Bakke mandates the diverse university to resemble the social field, but makes 
no explicit claim to speak for that field. If the diverse university speaks to the social field, it does 
so by producing citizens better prepared to live and work under the conditions of global capital; 
indeed, as we have pointed out, the university’s relationship with the historical processes that 
produce diversity (and discrimination, its underside) is quite fraught. 
 The Committee implies that to analyze, discuss, and compare the musical practices of 
underrepresented minorities is tantamount to speaking for those groups. Music studies assume a 
representative function, in the political sense of “standing for constituencies they speak for.” 
This move still further extends the logic of legibility expressed in the 1996 statement and the 
1997 program; now, not only can music theory detect and explain manifestations of resistance in 
musical texts and practice, it can actively intervene in those struggles. The question of legibility 
                                     
 61 Nancy Rao, “Introduction” to the SMT Diversity Committee’s Special Session, “Cultures Eliding, Cultures 
Colliding: Postcolonialism, Globalism, and the Analysis of Music” (Columbus, 2002), from the abstract at http:// 
societymusictheory.org/committees/diversity/2002 (accessed 15 July 2008), emphasis added. 
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now opens onto the question of enunciation: under whose sanction, or under whose legitimacy, 
can we claim to actually speak for somebody? Moreover, what is the destination of a politics in 
which those spoken for and those spoken to are the same? Under this logic, the communicative 
function and the representative function of music studies become concentric. Without specifying 
which, exactly, are the constituencies that music scholars speak to, let alone for, it is only by a 
stretch of the imagination that one can envisage audiences outside music scholarship’s discipli-
nary confines actually listening to what most of us in music studies discuss. 
 The enclosure created by the spoken-for/spoken-to dyad is ethical in nature; it demands 
that scholarly modes of representation and communication be intelligible to others and the same 
time that it resonates with their concerns and needs. As we’ve discussed with respect to anthro-
pology, these questions have animated very important disciplinary reorientations, but here we 
ask a different question: what is lost in such a heavy emphasis on ethics? For all its focus on 
ethical modes of address, the Committee seems unable to develop a mode of address that aims at 
the form of inclusion outlined in its earliest gestures toward self-definition. Despite the 
Committee’s political and methodological development, neither the SMT nor the Committee has 
delineated a more robust means to “talk” with African-American scholars. This cannot be a case 
of mere negligence; the SMT has demonstrated genuine interest in diversifying itself. It may be 
perhaps necessary to contemplate that there is no corporate identity that identifies as the commu-
nity of African-American music theorists. Most drastically, we would have to ask whether or 
not—and/or to what degree—music theory, as a discipline, might have failed to gain sufficient 
skills to make the social field legible from our place in the academy and thus talk to and listen to 
that world. 
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V. ADEQUATING DIVERSITY TO ITSELF 
 In Bakke, Powell claims that the university’s mission is to provide “that atmosphere 
which is most conducive to speculation, experimentation and creation.”62 Observing First 
Amendment rights, this triple “mission” can’t specify exactly how the diversifying academy 
should manage its constitutive institutions: universities, departments, centers, disciplines, sub-
disciplines, curricula, and hiring and tenure protocols. We have been using the dual processes of 
legibility and enunciation to explain how universities enfold diversification into their triple 
missions. The academy first has to find a way to read the social field to which its version of 
diversity is supposed to be relevant and adequate; the coordinates along which this process 
moves create conditions of legibility. The act of enunciation, then, transforms this vision of the 
social world into an action or intervention in that world.63 For example, in the case of university 
admissions, enunciation would consist of developing policies that address the needs of the social 
field as the university sees it and, finally, of figuring those policies as a means for achieving its 
mission. By moving along these two axes, the university reads the social field while simultane-
ously reading itself into it. 
 The social and political terms through which legibility and enunciation can be expressed 
change substantially when Powell’s Bakke decision comes under fire in 2003, as the Supreme 
Court hears two important challenges to the University of Michigan’s affirmative action 
program. The first, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher v. Lee Bollinger contests Michigan’s 
undergraduate admissions program, which automatically awards minority applicants twenty 
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 63 Cusset, French Theory, 156. 
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“points”; this policy is struck down as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.64 The 
second case, Barbara Grutter v. Lee Bollinger, is strikingly similar to Bakke, in the sense that 
both cases are brought against elite pre-professional institutions by white applicants who claim to 
have been rejected due to racial discrimination. In this case, the role of Allen Bakke is played by 
Barbara Grutter, a white applicant to the University of Michigan’s Law School. Justice 
O’Connor writes the decisive opinion, and while she upholds Powell’s Bakke decision in its 
entirety, she expands the scope of the state’s compelling interest in diversity in a few subtle yet 
important ways. 
 As we have noted, Powell rules that the state has compelling interest in diversity because 
of diversity’s educational benefits. O’Connor confirms this ruling, but also claims that diversity’s 
benefits extend beyond the university. First, leaning on an Amicus Brief from General Motors, 
she claims that “major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s 
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse 
people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints.”65 On one hand, O’Connor implies that diverse universi-
ties produce more employable graduates. Diversity’s benefits, in this case, are for the individual 
in the marketplace. One the other hand, those individuals, according to O’Connor, increase the 
efficiency of “the global marketplace.” In sum, academic diversity aids the corporations through 
which global capital circulates. 
                                     
 64 In applying these extra twenty points, Michigan claims to be using, simply, a quantitative version of Harvard’s 
“race as a plus model.” The court, however, finds that this policy “automatically ensured [an individual’s] specific 
and identifiable contribution to diversity” (Gratz, et al. v. Bollinger, et al., 539 U.S. 244 [2003], 9). The twenty-point 
system places a priori limits, then, on what counts as an applicant’s contribution to diversity, classifying some 
students are better able to contribute to campus diversity on the basis of ethno-racial identification alone. This policy 
fails at the level of the “equal footing” required by Powell in Bakke. 
 65 Grutter v. Bollinger, et. al., 539 U.S. 306 (2003), 7; cited hereafter as Grutter. 
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 Her second claim obliquely but powerfully addresses the problem of adequation not from 
the perspective of the academy, as Powell does, but from the perspective of the social world to 
which the academic is, supposedly, responsible:  
 
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is 
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified members of 
every race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have confi-
dence in the integrity of the institutions that provide this training.66 
 
O’Connor’s passionate statement raises a snarl of difficult questions. How do universities culti-
vate the trust and confidence of a citizenry? If any group doubted the university’s legitimacy, 
how would they register their dissatisfaction? How can an institution make visible its openness 
without tokenizing its minority participants? 
 Leaving these kinds of question unaddressed, O’Connor figures the diverse university as 
an axial point for progressive social change. The university produces citizens and workers who 
promote and understand diversity, while the university is itself allegedly accountable to the 
social world into which it sends those graduates. Through O’Connor’s version of accountability, 
one could envision the “citizenry” somehow contesting the life of the university. What actions on 
the part of the university would the “citizenry” legitimate? Within Bakke’s logic, only the univer-
sity’s fulfillment of its educational mandate (defined as “speculation, experimentation and 
creation”) would be subject to such a discussion. When O’Connor extends the state’s interest in 
educational diversity to the global marketplace, however, any discussion that produces citizens’ 
legitimation would have to address the relationship of the university to the market. Under this 
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expanded logic, it becomes nearly impossible to imagine a structure of critique or legitimation 
that keeps pace with both the scale and force of global capital. 
 Unwilling, of course, to pose such questions, O’Connor implies that it’s possible to graft 
what happens in a “partial academic sphere” onto the “social whole,” authorizing the academy to 
see itself as that “social whole.”67 This, in turn, grants (or perhaps better, affirms) that academics 
have a privileged “enunciative position and intellectual visibility” in that world.68 O’Connor’s 
logic encourages academics to pronounce themselves, in charged languages, upon a social field 
that is not set up to listen. Academic disciplines “see” the social world through technologies of 
knowledge of their own making. Understanding the conditions of possibility for knowledge 
production requires that we examine forces that affect this production, namely, the movement of 
transnational capital. Capital cannot be said to operate outside the academy if, as O’Connor 
implies, it constitutes the conditions of possibility for academic knowledge production. As an 
instrument for its reproduction, academic knowledge may, in its way, recreate global capital’s 
unequal distribution of wealth and resources. If this is true, then, it becomes very difficult to 
conceive of universities as laboratories for tolerance and social justice in the manner of Powell 
and O’Connor. Leaving behind Powell, and O’Connor’s versions of the part/whole relation, we 
hold that the whole, in this particular form of late capitalism, is immanent to all spheres of 
society. 
 We want now to deepen the contradictions that emerge when academic discourse is 
mapped onto social totalities without remainder. Academic disciplines “see” the social world 
through technologies of knowledge of their own making. And yet, understanding the conditions 
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of possibility for knowledge production requires that we examine forces affecting this produc-
tion—for instance the movement of transnational capital. These forces may at first glance appear 
to operate on different spheres from the academy. This may be so, but we can’t claim that these 
forces operate outside the academy if they constitute the conditions of possibility for academic 
knowledge production. As an instrument for its reproduction, academic knowledge may, in its 
way, recreate global capital’s unequal distribution of wealth and resources. If this is true, then, it 
becomes very difficult to conceive of universities as laboratories for tolerance and social justice 
in the manner of Powell and O’Connor. Instead of trying to recuperate Cusset’s, Powell’s, or 
O’Connor’s version of the part/whole relation, we hold that the whole, in this particular form of 
late capitalism, is immanent to all spheres of society. 
 Late capitalism has been much analyzed by academics in the humanities and the social 
sciences. Its totalizing context—which really is no context, for it is all there is, in an unprece-
dented form of universalism—transforms the political economy of culture. As we’ve discussed, 
the articulation of culture to political capital began with the major economic shifts of the early 
1970s, tiling the terrain over which the free-market economy would grow. It then became possi-
ble to both “manage” and instrumentalize expressions of cultural difference, fraying the path for 
a frightening homogenization of culture. This does not mean that all cultures become the same. 
Rather, it means that no “culture” is excluded from the rules of the free-market economy: 
cultures count and are recognized to the extent that they potentially contribute to this system with 
which they are coterminous.69 
                                     
 69 This is similar but not exact to what Bill Readings called “omniculture” in his widely read The University in 
Ruins (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). For Readings, culture has come to an end as a [Kantian] 
“regulative ideal” for the contemporary university. In its place, there is an omniculture out of which no culture is 
excluded and inside of which there is “no exteriority—real or fantastical—to serve as a battle line” (The University 
in Ruins, 203). 
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 Perhaps the most immediate consequence of this development is that the university enters 
a new relation to capital, becoming more and more “entrepreneurial.”70 Traditional academic 
enterprises (teaching, learning, and research) exist now under the condition that they attract 
capital—both private and public. The ability to attract capital becomes an enterprise’s funda-
mental value, placing those unable to do so under the risk of cuts. As a faculty-administrator put 
it to us, in such “culture,” if you are not growing (i.e., making new faculty hires, improving the 
quantitatively measured quality of your incoming graduate classes), you are shrinking. 
 This moment matches the ideals of liberalism to a degree unprecedented in contemporary 
politics. In the entrepreneurial, neoliberal university, economic competition trumps adversarial 
politics. Heavily “politicized” humanities departments compete and lose out to well-funded 
science programs. Perennially perched at the boundary between humanities and sciences, the 
social sciences reap the benefits of dealing with “the real world” and are handsomely supported 
by societies and foundations of all kinds. At the faculty level things are particularly intense. 
Competition fosters productivity, which in turn fosters the common good, or so the story goes. 
As competitors within an elite group of individualists, the legal framework in which we operate 
is one of “freely negotiated contractual obligations between juridical individuals in the market-
place” in which “individual property rights, the rule of law, and institutions of freely functioning 
markets and free trade” are favored and ultimately protected by the neoliberal state.71 This 
“juridical individual in the marketplace” adds to the predicament of the individual of juridical 
diversity, caught as she is between economic and ethical imperatives. 
                                     
 70 For a discussion of related issues, see Korsyn, Decentering Music, 176ff. 
 71 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 64–65. 
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 However, humanities professors’ ability to negotiate this predicament should come as no 
surprise. It is a domain where individuality, single-author work, personal interpretive contribu-
tions, and so on constitute academic remuneration. And among those committed to a politics of 
cultural identity, this individuality exists in a contradiction that unfolds yet again along the 
ethical/economic axis we have been exploring. That is, despite the quasi-economic compunction 
to distinguish oneself in competition with others, the hope nonetheless remains that a principled 
commitment to cultural identity may yet effect the transformation of a social field marked by 
discrimination and increasing material inequality. As we describe, however, this hope runs 
aground when the academic production of difference does not always lead to the mobilization of 
those differences against forces of transnational capital. 
 In the academic context, individuals are snared by the same ethical/economic contradic-
tion that troubles groups in other contexts. In the most basic sense, what is happening here is a 
splitting of individual and corporate identity—recall the limits that Bakke sets upon corporate 
bids for access to higher education. This raises the stakes for the humanities professor: the gap 
between corporate identity and individual increases within the ethical calculus of institutional 
diversification, as the demand for increasing affirmation of cultural identity within the economic 
calculations of the neoliberal university also increases. The ethical and the economical dimen-
sions of diversity fold into one another. The individual professor now has to do the ethical/ 
economical work of the corporate entity without having had the experience of becoming that 
corporate entity. At the same time, the neo-liberal university demands the production of still 
newer, still more diverse sites for the production of knowledge. Given this aporia, critical 
analysis of diversity in the academy ought to ask: what happens to cross-cultural understanding 
(which, according to O’Connor is supposed to help us build a more just nation) when the 
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mandate to diversity becomes inseparable from the mandate to compete? What happens when 
critical work in the humanities can’t intervene in the inequality whose potential amelioration 
made a social imperative of diversity? 
 Now, this is not to say that the social imperative to diversify is therefore mistaken or 
unnecessary. On the contrary, it is too important to let academic cultural-identity politics alone 
dictate its potential political trajectory. It is now more urgent than ever to insist on diversity, but 
also to remove the ethical carapace with which it has been saddled by the academic cultural-
identity industry. In this regard, the SMT’s Committee on Diversity’s 2007 abstract, in its first 
paragraph, went a long way in detailing the current stakes for the idea of diversity in the disci-
pline and the academy at large: 
 
The problem of ethnic diversity in the academy of the present is one that exhibits a bifur-
cated trend. On the one hand, university administrations are greatly encouraging their 
departments and programs to think broadly and interdisciplinarity, in ways that would 
appeal to constituencies with diverse ethnic backgrounds. Academic recruitment offices 
are also engaged, to varying degrees, in fierce competition over middle- and upper-class 
minority students in an effort to diversify the appearance of their populations. On the 
other hand, the rising cost of tuition and fees at universities all over the country are 
hindering working and, increasingly, middle-class students from attending college at all 
or are forcing these students to incur extensive debts that, in the present economy, are 
becoming unmanageable. This latter trend is negatively affecting racial and ethnic 
diversity in universities, particularly regarding members of underrepresented and under-
privileged minorities. [See Appendix 2 for the full text.] 
 
Among the many issues this statement addresses, three stand out for our analysis. First, it 
presents diversity as being “ethnic diversity.” Second, it identifies in no uncertain terms the issue 
of class disparity and of economic distribution as the fundamental challenge for a wider distribu-
tion of access to higher education. Third, it offers an analysis of an important contradiction, here 
called a “bifurcation.” However construed, the Committee here clearly opposes the management 
of diverse knowledge production and the administration of access to knowledge acquisition, on 
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the one hand, to the administration of economic distribution occurring in the broader field, on the 
other. 
 The statement’s focus on ethno-racial diversity reveals the depth of influence of the 
initial impulse of the Committee in 1996, to single out African-American scholars. This initial 
call is now diversified into a broader but perhaps more complicated category of “ethnic diver-
sity,” more redolent of the influence of multiculturalism and panethnicity than of the earlier, 
overtly racial categories. The power of the category “ethnic diversity” is evident in the invitation 
to “visible minorities” to publicly share their experience in the field (this appears later in the 
abstract)—that is, minorities to which I (Jairo Moreno) belong. The problem is that my own 
mark of difference, as discussed in the second section of this paper, is not reducible to what 
people see me as. I “pass,” as the saying goes. It is my speech accent (and apparently some social 
mores) that betrays my “ethnicity” to the unknown hearer. Among other things, the bias of 
“visibility” strikes us as paradoxical, given the discipline’s practiced care for the aural. But 
beyond the individual contingencies of a panelist, it is the deeply racialized logic of diversity that 
is most troubling. 
 Walter Benn Michaels, one of diversity’s most acute, though perhaps too boisterous 
critics, claims that the category of “culture” simply replaces “race” once it became socially and 
politically unacceptable to attribute racial identity to biological difference.72 Culture, according 
to Michaels, consequently emerged as race’s surrogate. Once culture is established as a proxy for 
race, however, any resistance to cultural diversity becomes tantamount to racism. Diversity, then, 
                                     
 72 Walter Benn Michaels, The Trouble with Diversity: How We Learned to Love Identity and Ignore Inequality 
(New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006). For an earlier, robustly researched critique of economic inequality and the 
powerlessness of multiculturalism to address it, see Brian M. Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique 
of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
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still racializes the social field. That is to say, a person’s cultural identification in and through a 
community of hypo-descent would be considered as concrete and immutable as her racial iden-
tification under the “one-drop rule.” Let’s look at what this racialization looks like in Bakke. 
Under what we have called the “color-blind” option of “genuine diversity,” Powell claims that, 
“a file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his potential contribution without the 
factor of race being decisive.”73 But consider what happens in a more “race-conscious” admis-
sions scenario. The following extract, often wrongly attributed to Powell, comes from the 
Harvard admissions guidelines Powell attached to his opinion. Here, we consider the hypotheti-
cal admission to Harvard of the following applicant: “a black who grew up in an inner-city 
ghetto of semi-literate parents whose academic achievement was lower but who had demon-
strated energy and leadership as well as an apparently-abiding interest in black power.”74 It 
would seem that in order to justify this hypothetical applicant’s race being decisive in her admis-
sion to college, Harvard leans on not only a very particular figuration of the experience of 
blackness, but also designates certain domains of knowledge as proper to that experience. Even 
the juridical category of diversity, then, resignifies biological quantification of race with a 
racializing qualitative distribution of ideas and mores, to paraphrase Justice Powell. 
 Culture seems to trump race here, but it does so without displacing the quasi-scientific 
logic of identification and classification that underpins biological racism. The biological model 
deploys the “one-drop rule” as its determining rubric. When culture replaces race, history (as a 
way of thinking of the community of hypo-descent) slides into the position that “blood” once 
occupied. History’s centrality, here, squares uncomfortably with the near-disavowal of historical 
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specificity we noted in Bakke. Recall Powell’s refusal to tailor his decision in Bakke to the 
minority/majority relations immanent to his historical moment. When Powell places diversity in 
an indefinite future, he posits it as a goal or aspiration. The ahistorical orientation of this goal 
yields few tools for understanding, critiquing, and analyzing current social conditions that this 
futural diversity is supposed to change. Powell expects that ethno-racial identity of minority or 
majority groups may change, but he doesn’t indicate how such changes might make legible 
larger and more complex shifts in the social and historical grids against which a “diversity” of 
the future should be calibrated. How can the diversity to which we aspire be tailored to the 
discriminatory social conditions that require this goal in the first place? Unable to answer this 
question, Powell divorces social justice from history. And yet, by 2003, we find diversity yoked 
not only to the nation’s educational mission, but also to both the market and to national security, 
making U.S. diversity valuable and useful in a global scale. The briefs, on which O’Connor 
leans, report diversity’s benefits as proven through past experience. But because her decision 
controls the future of affirmative action, she must make their testimony guarantee diversity’s 
future utility. Although diversity’s relationship to social justice and its history is unclear, at best, 
diversity’s utility is absolutely clear. This unbalanced relation between justice and utility, which 
now stands on the shoulders of national legislation, will have significant implications, as we 
discuss shortly. 
 Here we come to the second point we highlight from the 2007 abstract. Indeed, with the 
sharp rise in costs across colleges and universities in recent years, access to higher education has 
been confirmed as an elite affair. According to The College Board’s Annual Survey of Colleges, 
in 2005–06 the tuition cost for private four-year programs increased by 5.9%, while the total cost 
(tuition, room, board, and fees) increased by 5.65%. Public institutions’ figures were not terribly 
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different for the same period: tuition went up by 6.29%, and total costs went up by 5.62%. 
Combined with these increases, the logic of entitlements implied by university admissions’ 
“point systems” can be seen to radically affect access for applicants from the lower rungs of the 
economic ladder. In research conducted in 2003, a group of nineteen elite universities, including 
Harvard, was shown to award no points for low-income students, whereas race was given 28 
points, or athletic ability thirty points.75 A poor Chicana applicant, for example, would not be 
given preference over the child of Chicano medical doctors. Sometimes economic disadvantage 
will seem to be indissociable from ethno-racial status, as in the case of Harvard’s hypothetical 
applicant from the “inner-city ghetto,” and sometimes it will not appear at all, as in the scenario 
we mention above. In both cases, however, economic disadvantage will not appear as a term 
independent of ethno-racial categories. In this sense, Harvard’s Supreme Court-endorsed 1970s 
undergraduate admissions formula for counting race has perhaps worked too well, except not in 
the way that may benefit most students. Today, there are more black students at Harvard than 
poor students, Michaels reminds us.76 A quick look at the makeup of other universities in the 
U.S. shows that the trend has not changed. 
 At New York University, in statistics given by the IPEDS-EF,77 the percentage of Black 
non-Hispanic students from 2005–07 declined from 5% to 4.02%, and for Hispanic students 
                                     
 75 William G. Bowen, Martin A. Kurzweil, Eugene M. Tobin, and Susanne C. Pichler, Equity and Excellence in 
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government’s National Center for Education Statistics. The designation “EF” is for fall enrollment. 
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from 7.9% to 7.4%. These changes occurred while the tuition and standard admissions’ scores 
increased. For a university whose motto is “A private university in the public service,” located in 
arguably one of the country’s most ethnically diverse cities (along with Los Angeles), which 
prides itself as uniquely open to this ethnic diversity, this drop in percentages points toward 
broader issues of economic inequality. Indeed, as the university’s applicant pool has become 
more “competitive” (i.e., high schools graduates with more impressive application packages, 
higher test scores, and so on) so it has become less ethno-racially and economically diverse. It 
also happens to be one of the most proactive universities anywhere in the states in establishing 
satellite campuses abroad, including a full program of studies at Abu-Dhabi (United Arab 
Emirates) that will feature, of course, a music program within its liberal arts curriculum.78 This is 
globalized diversity, to be sure, except that Abu-Dhabi foots the bill, and that—being beyond the 
reach of U.S. legislation—the ideals of diversity in effect stateside might be subordinate to very 
different interests there. And as recruitment officers at elite four-year colleges and universities 
scramble to find the prized minority candidates from the middle class, applicants to two-year 
programs at junior and community colleges—a traditional source of higher education for 
economically disadvantaged sectors—increasingly no longer qualify for financial assistance due 
to major shifts in the system of loans for higher education.79 
                                     
 78 Not coincidentally, from 2005–07, international student enrollment at NYU went from 4% to 5.5%, the largest 
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 As the diversity cause increasingly encompasses the question of economic disparity, we 
are consequently dealing more and more frequently with economic issues that the humanities 
have historically considered themselves unable address. As the diversity cause looks lower in the 
education system, we find equally intractable problems. We could address this issue from many 
perspectives, and here we do so by noting the state of music education in New York City, the 
U.S. city that is home to the most orchestras and probably the greatest number of musical 
employment opportunities. As of 2008, New York City’s public school system has 958 teachers 
serving 1.1 million students. One in five schools has no music teacher. 
 The argument is repeatedly made that to ask questions about diversity at the level of 
higher education is to start both far too late and in the wrong place. By the time a student is, say, 
eighteen years old, whatever access she would have had from K–12 determines her potential 
admittance to campuses clamoring for greater diversity. Michaels makes this point particularly 
powerfully when he critiques Harvard’s 2004-to-present tuition remission policy. In 2004, the 
policy states that Harvard will not ask families with an income less than $40,000/year to con-
tribute to tuition; in 2006, Harvard raises the income cap to $60,000/year.  
 Many students that fall within this income bracket, Michaels reminds us, wouldn’t be 
viable candidates for admission to Harvard in the first place; this policy bring too little and acts 
too late with respect to educational disparities that follow from economic disadvantage. The 
notion that diversity is politically viable without requiring a redistribution of resources gives new 
meaning to Stephen L. Carter’s notion of practicing “racial justice on the cheap.”80 It’s hard to 
ignore what has happened, what is happening, and what might happen when cultural recognition 
                                     
 80 Carter, “Affirmative Distraction.” 
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and anti-discrimination are folded together in either the juridico-political realm, or in the 
cultural-identitarian orientation of academic politics. 
 And so we get to our third and concluding point, what the Committee calls the prob-
lematic “bifurcation” between diverse knowledge production and unequal access to institutions 
where this knowledge is produced. The bifurcation the Committee abstract describes is indeed 
real. But it is neither unique to the contemporary American crucible of a racially and ethnically 
heterogeneous social field nor alien to the constitution of the politics of democracy (and not just 
liberal democracy) that organize social life today. With this, we return to our point of departure: 
the relation of diversity to universality. To understand this, we must take a look at the 
distribution of political orders we call democracy, and to this institution’s judicial order.81 
 The telos of a common good drives the universal appeal of diversity. The vision of a 
common good inspires the Supreme Court’s legislation to achieve a national society embodying 
its heterogeneity through all its civil institutions. It also informs a high-profile academic’s call to 
her peers to “treating society as the sum of several equally valuable but distinct racial and ethnic 
groups.”82 Diversity is just and good for all, and useful and good for all of society: it is universal. 
Indeed, in matters of equality in social distribution, as Jacques Rancière puts it, “it seems hard to 
draw a line here between the community of Good and the utilitarian social contract.”83 But a line 
must be drawn, for it is precisely the naturalization of the relation between the just and the useful 
that has made it impossible, historically, for the Supreme Court and the academy to articulate the 
universality of diversity to the particularity of the U.S. social field. 
                                     
 81 Our discussion of Athenian democracy follows the analysis of Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and 
Philosophy, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999 [1995]). 
 82 Catharine R. Stimpson, “On Differences,” Modern Language Association Presidential Address, 1990, Publica-
tions of the Modern Language Association 106 (1991): 402–11; emphasis added. Stimpson, a noted feminist scholar 
in English studies, serves as Dean of the Graduate School at NYU, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. 
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 Consider for a moment that much of the discourse on diversity mobilizes the ethical 
imperative to distribute access and resources justly. We have seen how this ethical dimension 
clashes with the economic dimension installed when groups and individuals compete for those 
resources. Bakke precisely embodied efforts to maximize what is useful for most (the continuing 
inclusion of minorities) and minimize what is harmful for many (the creation of a system of 
exclusion and uneven privilege on the basis of racial difference). These efforts revealed that the 
merely useful is not necessarily just. The Michigan cases of 2003, for instance, and the recent 
situation at Harvard, where there are more black students than poor ones, indicate a persistent 
tension between the useful and the just. Perhaps for this reason, historically the useful has been 
folded into the just. We are talking, then, about a particular notion of justice, and ultimately of 
the constitution of a democratic society on the basis of such a notion. 
 But what organizes such a notion of justice? First, justice cannot be achieved by quanti-
fying what is gained and/or lost in a particular instance of wrongdoing and compensating 
individuals and groups accordingly. For instance, when Powell determines that no single institu-
tion of higher education can be held liable for the legacy of social discrimination that minorities 
have experienced, he refuses to make of justice a matter of historical reparation or to make of 
legislation simply a means to adjudicate on the basis of individual (and group) loses and profits. 
 Another model of justice is distributive: “each party takes only what is its due.”84 We 
catch glimpses of this model in Harvard’s elaborate point system adopted by Powell, where the 
various “parties” making an individual applicant are given their due count. But we also know 
that this diversity initiative falters precisely when this individual party becomes a collectivity. 
                                     
 83 Rancière, Disagreement, 3. 
 84 Rancière, Disagreement, 5. 
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This notion of distributive justice (or just distribution) thus pivots on the double determination of 
“what is properly due to whom.” On this vexing double determination stands not only justice, but 
also the very distribution of entitlements of the body politic. Based in classical Athenian politics, 
this is a foundational problem for the definition of democratic politics in the West.  
 The first question is whether justice can be deduced from what is due to individuals, or 
instead must be deduced from a communitarian principle. In an early formulation, Aristotle 
proposed a determination of what is “due” at the level of the individual: no one takes more or 
less of the advantageous (useful) than of the disadvantageous (harmful). This common-sense 
approach amounts to little more than an economy in which the individual exchanges goods (i.e., 
the useful for the harmful and vice-versa) in order to reach that magic balancing point of having 
taken her “due.” Whatever social collectivity might follow from this economy would be hardly 
more than an aggregation—or “sum,” to use Stimpson’s arithmetic formula—of individuals. On 
the contrary, a more robust collectivity, indeed, a political community, must be founded on a 
common being. This ethos answers to the first question: whatever is properly due is due to the 
community as a whole. 
 The communitarian solution introduces a new problematic for defining justice, for “what 
is at issue is what citizens have in common and the main concern is with the way the forms of 
exercising and of controlling the exercising of this common capacity are divided up.”85 If what 
all citizens have in common is their being equally citizens of a political body, and if individuals 
cannot serve as the basis for just distribution, then it is groups that need to be shown that their 
share is proportional to what they bring to the common good. Distribution abandons the arith-
                                     
 85 Rancière, Disagreement, 5; emphasis original. 
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metical logic of equality in exchanges and balances for a geometrical logic of proportions. How 
is this done? 
 In the language we borrowed from Daniel Bell, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
articulation of cultural identity to a political project was realized through and made possible a set 
of entitlements. We suggest here a correlation between the relative effectiveness of entitlements 
as a political expedient in the U.S. and their inception at the very foundation of democracy in the 
West. Athenian democracy organized the citizenry according to a set of three entitlements 
(axiaï): wealth (oligarchs), excellence (aristocrats), and freedom (demos). From this perspective, 
the common good constitutes the harmonious ordering of these entitlements. However, this 
harmony harbors a secret disproportion.86 One entitlement weighs more than the others: the 
objectively given and quantifiable wealth of the oligarchy. Such wealth would be ordered by the 
arithmetical logic that the geometry of harmoniousness is supposed to overcome. 
 Compared with this entitlement to wealth, what, then, is an entitlement to freedom? 
Rancière notes that, in the Athenian context, “freedom” is defined negatively—as the condition 
of not being a slave. Or, more specifically this means doing the same work slaves do, without 
being a slave oneself. Under this negative definition, the people are “free” in the same way that 
the oligarchy and the aristocracy are free, although the latter two groups enjoy two additional 
freedoms: the freedom to accumulate wealth and the freedom to pursue artistic and intellectual 
excellence. The people, on the other hand, possess no share that is properly or uniquely theirs; in 
Rancière’s words “the people are simply free like the rest.”87 The people furnish a labor force 
that slaves once provided, and it is precisely their “freedom” to labor in this way that constitutes 
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 87 Rancière, Disagreement, 8; emphasis original. 
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their contribution to the good of the community. That the people are free is good for the entire 
community. Freedom is not merely good, it embodies justice and usefulness; small wonder it is 
universal. 
 One has to marvel at the creativity of this political order. All citizens are free, but not all 
are free in the same way. We know that it will take centuries before the possibility of a democ-
racy in which freedom to accumulate wealth or achieve excellence would become available to 
all, at least in theory or as an ideal.88 But we also have suggested how this particular configura-
tion of democracy (i.e., liberal democracy) cannot contain its internal contradiction between 
economic individualism and ethical communitarianism. It is precisely because of this contradic-
tion that freedom, now transformed into the ever more powerful duplet “equality and liberty,” 
comes to embody the ethical dimension of the political. That is, freedom becomes the universal 
abstraction in whose name all political projects are consolidated, diversity included. 
 Freedom does not—cannot—displace the entitlement of wealth of the oligarchy from the 
political order. Freedom depends on its continued existence. On the one hand, the entitlement of 
wealth constitutes the horizon of freedom’s aspiration. On the other hand, freedom aims to 
subsume within itself the entitlement of wealth, under the logic of equal material distribution. 
The paradox should be obvious. But it is perhaps on the very existence of this paradox that diver-
sity initiatives might focus in order to begin moving past the impasse they encounter in a social 
and political system driven by the logic of the free-market—the powerful logic that, without 
irony, creates a hybrid out of two incompatible entitlements. 
                                     
 88 For a discussion of how freedom of speech, one of the key expressions of freedom in Athenian democracy 
becomes a problem for democracy, in the well-known form of tyranny of the majority, see Michel Foucault, 
Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e). 2001), 77ff. 
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∑ 
 In the U.S., recent public and scattered academic commentaries have begun to pay greater 
attention to diversity’s material dimension—a move that this paper contextualizes in historical, 
philosophical and juridical perspectives. Indeed, one of our goals here has been to offer a 
detailed exposition of what diversity initiatives stand to gain when re-orientated around 
economic inequality. By foregrounding economic disadvantage, the 2007 Committee proposes 
an alternative inquiry into diversity, although it retains the sediment of a cultural-identity 
approach. In precisely this historical moment, however, we see the Supreme Court strike down 
integration models simultaneously in two school districts in Seattle (Washington) and Louisville 
(Kentucky): Meredith v. Jefferson County School Board, and Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.89 The polemical and conservative Roberts’ Court 
affirms both Bakke and Grutter, but severely limit both cases; Roberts’ majority opinion implies 
that the categories that define “genuine diversity” cannot function at the level of elementary and 
secondary education, while also asserting that diversity’s educational benefits at the post-
secondary level are not legible in elementary education where achievement is measured by test-
scores90 and not by “classroom discussion [that is] livelier, more spirited and more enlighten-
ing.”91 Bakke’s irrevocable tie to post-secondary education emerges as its fatal weakness, in this 
case. Roberts’ Court ultimately concludes that the Jefferson County and Seattle School Boards 
are practicing racial balancing for its own sake. 
                                     
 89 Crystal D. Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 551 U.S. 05-915 (2007). 
 90 Parents Involved in Community School v. Seattle School District et al., 551 U.S. 05-908 (2007), 17; cited 
hereafter as Meredith and Parents Involved. 
 91 Grutter, 7. 
CIMINI AND MORENO: ON DIVERSITY 
 
GAMUT 2/1 (2009) 180 
 Ironically enough, however, Jefferson County maintains that its use of race was intended 
not only to match the racial composition of its high school to the racial demographics of the 
surrounding community, but also to combat changes in the Louisville housing market that 
threaten to segregate schools both racially and economically. In light of this concatenation of 
race and class, Emily Bazelon, reporting the case for The New York Times, asks, “Is the purpose 
of integration simply to mix students of different colors for the sake of equity or to foster greater 
familiarity and comfort among the races? Should integration necessarily translate into concrete 
gains like greater achievement for all students? If so, is mixing students by race the most effec-
tive mechanism for attaining it?”92 As a result of Roberts’ ruling, Louisville is focusing on 
barriers of class, of socio-economic advantage and disadvantage in pursuit of greater integration, 
considering assets, income, and the level of parental education as central criteria for school 
distribution; this move toward class-conscious admissions is compliant with Brown v. Board of 
Education, which mandates “a system of determining admission to the public schools on a non-
racial basis.”93 Race-consciousness now takes a different form, responsive to the social field in a 
way that is unprecedented in both Bakke and Grutter. To this end, writing for the majority, 
Justice Kennedy maintains that “Districts could also be ‘race conscious’ . . . when they draw 
school boundaries, choose sites for new schools and direct money to particular programs. But in 
these situations, they would usually be limited to taking into account the racial composition of a 
neighborhood rather than the race of an individual student.”94 One has to wonder why it took so 
long to articulate the intrinsic inequality of this democratic society to issues of race-
                                     
 92 Emily Bazelon, “The Next Kind of Integration,” New York Times (20 July 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/07/20/magazine/20integration-t.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 21 July 2008). 
 93 Cited in Meredith and Parents Involved, 40. 
 94 Bazelon, “The Next Kind of Integration.” 
CIMINI AND MORENO: ON DIVERSITY 
 
GAMUT 2/1 (2009) 181 
consciousness, or, in the terms we have outlined in this article, to disarticulate diversity from 
cultural-identity issues. 
 There are no conclusive answers to this query. As it turns out, since the mid-1960s, 
researchers have carried out work on the correlation between class and educational 
achievement.95 A great majority of these studies identified patterns that positively link class inte-
gration with academic achievement. To be sure, there have been detractors96 and research 
conclusions can never be said to constitute absolute or foolproof solutions to social problems. 
But in the academy, this parallel “history” of diversity has remained hidden by a thick blanket of 
liberal humanist discourse that seeks to keep warm the corpse of a utopian equality of represen-
tation exclusively at the level of cultural identity. Bazelon’s question—“are we talking about 
equity or greater social integration and familiarity?”—separates the economical from the ethical. 
As we’ve suggested, the “separation” does not mark the bifurcation of a previously unitary 
cultural-political field; rather, we maintain that this field is intrinsically binary. Bazelon’s move 
helps resignify the ethical as a dimension in which people might share a common being 
(economic similarity) in order to confront an uncommon being (the persistence of ethnic and 
racial categories and inequality in this economic society). We believe that it is precisely by 
                                     
 95 James S. Coleman, et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, 1966); Christopher Jencks, Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and School-
ing in America (New York: Basic Books, 1972); Gary Orfield and Susan E. Eaton, Dismantling Segregation: The 
Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education (New York: New Press, 1996); Amy Stuart Wells and Robert L. 
Crain, Stepping Over the Color Line: African-American Students in White Suburban Schools (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997); Richard D. Kahlenberg, All Together Now: Creating Middle-Class Schools through Public 
School Choice (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001); and Douglas N. Harris, Lost Learning, 
Forgotten Promises: A National Analysis of School Racial Segregation, Student Achievement, and “Controlled 
Choice” Plans (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2006). 
 96 Ronald Ferguson, Towards Excellence with Equity: An Emerging Vision for Closing the Achievement Gap 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press, 2007). 
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engaging the economic and the material that the potentially problematic metaphysics of cultural 
identity can be both neutralized and maintained. 
∑ 
 In conclusion, we wish to turn back over a decade and return, yet again, to the Commit-
tee’s call to reach out actively to African-American music theorists. We hope to have shown with 
historical and theoretical clarity how such a “reaching-out” might have to contend with juridical 
and academic institutions that are themselves subject to the complex, shifting distribution of the 
economical and the ethical as detailed here. The same goes for the category of the individual. 
Whether such an effort reproduces or contests the neoliberal orientation of the academic 
humanities remains an open question. Attention to the complex network of legislative, economic, 
and social forces mobilized by “diversity” is central to this reflection, as is a greater awareness 
and knowledge of the many registers at which this network operates. This awareness, as shown 
for example in Grutter, must be global in scale. How might the Committee marry its mandate to 
“include minorities” with this recent move toward class-based integration? How might greater 
attention to diversity’s economic dimension precipitate change in the way in which “difference” 
has been thought from a music theoretical perspective? It is perhaps sustained engagement with 
questions like these that a project like this one should next attempt. And if it seems unfair that a 
small professional academic society such as the SMT may be subject to such intense and 
comprehensive scrutiny, we maintain quite the opposite. That is, it is precisely because of the 
complexity and enormity of this most persistent of social challenges that we need to—must—
engage other fields, other specialists, other modes of thinking about “diversity” and “difference.” 
We are linked, fundamentally, to the whole range of institutions, political practices, and 
economic forces we have explored here. We risk a lot more by refusing to extend a call to them 
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than by remaining caught in modes of thinking about diversity that can no longer diversify. 
Whatever well-intentioned forces tie us to a “we” that pre-exists the question of “how to become 
more diverse” need to be displaced. The question itself, eloquently raised by the Committee in its 
2007 abstract, makes necessary a future formation that cannot be anticipated, a “we” that perhaps 
will not be immediately legible because the actually existing “we” would have diverged from 
itself. But then, if and when this formation becomes legible, it will be high time again, as it is 
today, to insist in asking: “How to become diverse.” 
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APPENDIX 1 
SMT COMMITTEE ON DIVERSITY, 1996 STATEMENT97 
 
 The Committee on Diversity organized two sessions for the Baton Rouge conference. 
One was an informal breakfast session, “Diversifying Theory and the SMT,” and the other was a 
paper session, “Expanding the Analytical Canon—Music Theory and Recent Music from 
Outside the Art-Music Mainstream.” The attendance by conference participants at both sessions 
was heartening to the committee, and the response indicated a real interest on the part of SMT 
members in addressing issues of diversity. 
 As a starting point for diversifying the attendees at the annual meeting, the committee 
had invited to the Baton Rouge conference theory faculty at historically black colleges and 
universities and some African-American professors teaching at other institutions. In writing to 
these people, we found that only five of the 126 faculty teaching theory at historically black 
institutions are members of SMT. In addition, of the ten African-American theorists sent to us on 
a list by a colleague in the AMS, all of whom have doctorates and university positions, only four 
are members of SMT. Clearly, there is more work to be done to include minorities in the SMT. 
 Anne Hall, who initiated the work of this new committee as the first chair, relinquished 
her chair position and seat on the committee at the Baton Rouge conference. Two new members, 
Vincent Benitez and Kristin Taavola, were appointed to the committee. We agreed to work on 
several projects for this coming year, including a Web page, submitting a proposal for a formal 
session at Phoenix, working with the AMS Committee on Cultural Diversity on an informal 
session for students and faculty at Phoenix, participating in the SMT mentoring project, and 
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exploring the possibility of running a summer workshop for theory faculty on incorporating 
music from outside the standard analytical canon into theory courses. 
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APPENDIX 2 
SMT COMMITTEE ON DIVERSITY, 2007 STATEMENT98 
 
SMT Diversity Committee’s Special Session 
“Ethnic Diversity in Music Theory: Voices from the Field” 
Panel Moderator: Jeannie Ma. Guerrero (Eastman School of Music) 
Panelists: YouYoung Kang (Scripps College), Suminth Gopinath (University of Minnesota), 
Jairo Moreno (New York University), Horace Maxile (University of North Carolina, Asheville) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 The problem of ethnic diversity in the academy of the present is one that exhibits a bifur-
cated trend. On the one hand, university administrations are greatly encouraging their 
departments and programs to think broadly and interdisciplinarily, in ways that would appeal to 
constituencies with diverse ethnic backgrounds. Academic recruitment offices are also engaged, 
to varying degrees, in fierce competition over middle- and upper-class minority students in an 
effort to diversify the appearance of their populations. On the other hand, the rising cost of 
tuition and fees at universities all over the country are hindering working and, increasingly, 
middle-class students from attending college at all or are forcing these students to incur extensive 
debts that, in the present economy, are becoming unmanageable. This latter trend is negatively 
affecting racial and ethnic diversity in universities, particularly regarding members of underrep-
resented and underprivileged minorities. 
 The Society for Music Theory faces substantial challenges on both fronts. Regarding the 
first challenge, the Society is at a crossroads of sorts—and has been for several years—in which 
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the conceptual and scholarly broadening of the field has begun to attract an increasingly diverse 
cohort of future scholars. And yet, this very broadening of the field has led it, and these scholars, 
to imagine themselves increasingly as scholars within “music studies” (Krims) who participate in 
historical-musicological, ethnomusicological, and music-theoretical conversations within their 
work. American music theory’s identity crisis has unsurprisingly elicited a retrenchment of sorts, 
and the resulting détente—which has lasted for over a decade—has facilitated the de facto 
marginalization of non-traditional subject matter, which is relegated to evening sessions, the 
“back pages” of journals, or venues for publication not typically associated with music theory. 
 The second challenge is of even greater import, given that the present condition in the US 
of increasing economic scarcity and elite wealth concentration is precipitously returning the 
academy to its pre-WWII role as a site for cultivating upper-class privilege. Even if the SMT is 
able to overcome its short-term diversity problems, what are the long-term prospects for the 
ethnic diversity of American music theory in an academy increasingly inaccessible to the vast 
majority of the populace? 
 The idea of margins and reading them could apply to identifying potential scholars from 
underrepresented groups. While some contend that “You got tuh go there tuh know there” (Zora 
Neal Hurston), we do not necessarily have to entrust non-traditional material to insiders alone. 
What constitutes “the academy” today might need redefinition. Numbers may be increasing at 
community colleges, smaller state colleges, Historically Black Colleges, and other minority-
serving institutions. Thus the question of ethnic diversity in American music theory may have to 
be expanded to consider institutions where most SMT members do not teach—and the ramifica-
tions of that additional layer of marginalization to the Society. 
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 The Diversity Committee’s panel will present four scholars within the field who identify 
as “visible minorities” and seek to foster a discussion on the wider problems of diversity within 
the Society of Music Theory. The panelists’ presentations will include biographical discussions 
of navigating through the academy as minorities, experiences with university-administrative 
policies on ethnic diversity, and proposals for improving diversity within the field (including 
ideas such as the hiring of a full-time staff position devoted to recruiting minority scholars). 
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APPENDIX 3 
SMT COMMITTEE ON DIVERSITY, 2001 SESSION LIST OF PAPERS AND PRESENTERS99 
 
SMT Diversity Committee’s Special Session 
“Expanding the Canon V: Musical Symbolism across Cultures” 
Committee and Session Chair: Yayoi Uno Everett (Emory University) 
Panelists: Steven Bruns (University of Colorado at Boulder), Siglind Bruhn (University of 
Michigan), Nancy Rao (Rutgers University), Deborah Wong (University of California at 
Riverside) 
Respondent: Robert Hatten (Indiana University) 
 
[PAPERS] 
 
[i] “Symbolism in the Music of George Crumb,” Steven Bruns (University of Colorado at 
Boulder) 
[ii] “Three Representations of God’s Voice in Twentieth-Century Music,” Siglind Bruhn 
(University of Michigan) 
[iii] “Boundary Crossing in Poéme Lyrique II,” Nancy Rao (Rutgers University) 
[iv] “Jazz Incarcerated: Asian American Memory, Redress, and (Re)Constitution,” Deborah 
Wong (University of California at Riverside) 
 
 
                                     
 99 Excerpted from http://societymusictheory.org/committees/diversity/2001 (accessed 4 August 2008). See link 
for paper abstracts. 
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APPENDIX 4 
SMT COMMITTEE ON DIVERSITY, 1997 SESSION LIST OF PAPERS AND PRESENTERS100 
 
Expanding the Analytical Canon: A Practicum  
Participants: 
Keith Waters, University of Colorado, Boulder, “Introduction to Pitch-Class Set Theory: 
Harbison and Coltrane” 
Vincent Benitez, Bowling Green University, “Twentieth-Century Musical Concepts and the 
Music of the Beatles” 
Eric Lai, Baylor University, “Aggregate Unfolding: A ‘Yijung’ Perspective” 
Kristin Taavola, Sarah Lawrence College, “Zen and the Art of Twelve-Tone Composition”  
Kristin Wendland, Morris Brown College, “Orchestration in Works by Adolphus Hailstork and 
Alvin Singleton” 
Dave Headlam, Eastman School of Music, “‘Whole Lotta Sound’: Timbre in Rock” 
Yayoi Uno, University of Colorado, Boulder, “Aural Skills Pedagogy Involving Non-Western 
Musics: Strategies for Engendering a Holistic Musical Experience” 
Ellie M. Hisama, Ohio State University, “Race, Representation, and Analysis” 
Ann Hawkins, University of South Florida, “Toward a Model for Comparative Analysis” 
Dwight Andrews (Emory University), Session Respondent 
∑ 
1997 SESSION DEMOGRAPHICS 
By gender By race/ethnicity 
Men: 5 African-American: 2 
Women: 5 Asian and Asian-American: 3 
 Hispanic: 1 
 White American: 4 
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for paper abstracts. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This article is part of a special forum titled “Ethnic Diversity in Music Theory: Voices from the 
Field.” Diversity has a relatively short but complex history inseparable from a vexing politics of 
cultural recognition in, and economic access to, American higher-education institutions. The 
authors consider this history along three interrelated axes—juridical, socio-political, and 
subjective—in order to discern the relation of cultural recognition and economic access to the 
ethos of the neoliberal university and to the structure of democratic institutions in late capitalism. 
The programmatic labor of the Society for Music Theory’s Committee on Diversity (1996–2007) 
provides the empirical backdrop for their discussion.  
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